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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, Supreme Court Case No. 41338 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporaton, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III 
and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and 
as husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE DENNIS E. GOFF 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
ERIC R. CLARK 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
EAGLE, IDAHO 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company. ) 
) 
Pia inti ff-Respondent ) 
) 
V ) 
) 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY. INC.. an Idaho ) 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and ) 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually. and as ) 
husband and '-Vifo. ) 
) 
Defondants-Appellants. ) 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket T\o. 41338-2013 
Ada County No. 2009-9974 
A Clerk1s Record and Reporter1s Transcript was filed Decemher 21. 201 I. in appeal 
\lo. 38338, Moscll equities V. Berryhill: therefore, good cause appearing. 
IT I I ER EBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record rn this case shall be 
AUGMENTED to include the Court Fik, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior 
appeal No. 37338. 
Ir FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall pn:pare and file a 
LIMITED CLERKS RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents rcquestrd in the 
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included 
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 38338. 
IT FURTHER JS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and 
lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT with the District Court. \Vhich .-,hail 
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings 
included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 38338. The LIMITED CLERK'S 
RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT shall be filed with this Court after settlement. 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL··· Docket No. 41338-2013 
,_:::=-:::::::.: ... :.::-::.: ·, .... 
000003
DATED this /Otlt day of September, 2013. 
Fo?he Supreme Court 
ienw.·e~~ 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
District Court Judge 
' . · ...... ~.~- - , ... _.;;_,, 
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Date: 10/25i2013 
Time: 02:48 PM 
Pqge 1 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Mosen Equities LLC vs. Berryhill _Company Inc, etal. 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date 
5/28/2009 
6/8/2009 
6/16/2009 
7/1/2009 
7/6/2009 
7/10/2009 
7/20/2009 
7/22/2009 
9/14/2009 
9/21/2009 
9/22/2009 
9/28/2009 
Code 
NCOC 
COIVIP 
SMFI 
AFOS 
NOAP 
MOTN 
ORDQ 
CJWO 
NOTC 
MOTN 
MEMO 
MOTN 
AFFD 
MEMO 
NOTH 
HRSC 
RSPS 
RPLY 
DCHH 
AMCO 
MOTN 
MEMO 
MOTN 
AFFD 
HRSC 
AFFD 
User 
CCGARDAL 
CCGARDAL 
CCGARDAL 
CCGDULKA 
CCHOLMEE 
CCHOLMEE 
CCNELSRF 
CCNELSRF 
CCNELSRF 
CCHOLMEE 
CCHOLMEE 
CCHOLMEE 
CCHOLMEE 
CCHOLMEE 
CCPRICDL 
CCPRICDL 
CCAMESLC 
CCSIMMSM 
DCKORSJP 
CCRANDJD 
CCRANDJD 
CCRANDJD 
CCWRIGRM 
CCWRIGRM 
MCBIEHKJ 
MCBIEHKJ 
New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Complaint Filed 
Summons Filed 
Affidavit Of Service (06/03/09) 
Notice Of Appearance (Williams for Berryhill & 
Company Inc, John e Berryhill Ill and Amy 
Berryhill) 
Judge 
Patricia Young 
Patricia Young 
Patricia Young 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion for Disqualification of Judge Without Cheri C. Copsey 
Cause 
Order Granting Motion for Disqualification of Cheri C. Copsey 
Judge w/o Cause 
Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/O Darla S. Williamson 
Cause 
Notice of Reassignment to Judge Darla Darla S. Williamson 
Williamson 
Motion to Dismiss Darla S. Williamson 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Motion for a Protective Order 
Affidavit of Daniel E Williams Re: Motion 
Memorandum in Support of Motion 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Darla S. Williamson 
Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/22/2009 02:45 Darla S. Williamson 
PM) Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Protective 
Order 
Response to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Darla S. Williamson 
Protective Order 
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Darla S. Williamson 
Hearing result for Motion held on 07/22/2009 Darla S. Williamson 
02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Pages Motion to 
Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order 
Amended Complaint Filed Darla S. Williamson 
Motion to Reconsider the Courts Dismissal of Darla S. Williamson 
John and Amy Berryhill 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Darla S. Williamson 
Mosell Equities Motion to Compel Responses and Darla S. Williamson 
Requests 
Affidavit of Counsel Darla S. Williamson 
Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Darla S. Williamson 
10/14/2009 02:45 PM) 
Affidavit of Daniel E Williams Darla S. Williamson 
000005
Date: 10/25/2013 
Time: 02:48 PM 
Page 2 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal. 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill 111, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User Judge 
9/29/2009 NOTH CCPRICDL Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Reconsider the Darla S. Williamson 
Courts Dismissal of Defendants John and Amy 
Berryhill 
10/6/2009 OB.IE CCHOLMEE Objection to the Defendants Renewed Motion for Darla S. Williamson 
Protective Order 
10/7/2009 MEMO CCGARDAL Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Darla S. Williamson 
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
10/14/2009 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on Darla S. Williamson 
10/14/2009 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Pages and Motion for 
Reconsider the Courts Dismissal 
HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Darla S. Williamson 
11/18/2009 02:45 PM) 
10/15/2009 NOTS CCSIMMSM Notice Of Service Darla S. Williamson 
10/29/2009 HRVC DCTHERTL Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on Darla S. Williamson 
11/18/2009 02:45 PM: Hearing Vacated 
NOHG CCTOWNRD Notice Of Hearing Darla S. Williamson 
HRSC CCTOWNRD Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Darla S. Williamson 
12/02/2009 02:45 PM) 2nd Motion 
11/3/2009 MOTN MCBIEHKJ Second Motion to Dismiss Darla S. Williamson 
NOID MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Intent To Take Default Darla S. Williamson 
11/6/2009 MOTN CCAMESLC Motion to Strike Three Day Notice of Intent to Darla S. Williamson 
Take Default and Default Judgment 
AFSM CCAMESLC. Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Strike and Take Darla S. Williamson 
Default 
MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and Darla S. Williamson 
take Default 
11/9/2009 NOTC MCBIEHKJ Notice of Hearing ( 12/2/09 @ 2:45 PM) Darla S. Williamson 
11/10/2009 AFFD CCBOURPT Affidavit of Eric Clark Filed in Opposition to Darla S. Williamson 
Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiff's ThreeDay 
Notice of Intent to take Default and Filed in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motions for Sanctions 
RSPS CCBOURPT Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike Darla S. Williamson 
Plaintiff's Three Day Notice of INtent to take 
Default and Default Judgment and Motion for 
Sactions 
11/18/2009 MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Darla S. Williamson 
11/25/2009 RSPS CCDWONCP Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Second Darla S. Williamson 
Motion to Dismiss 
11/30/2009 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Darla S. Williamson 
REPL CCLATICJ Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Second Darla S. Williamson 
Motion to Dismiss 
AFFD CCLATICJ Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams Re Plaintiff's Motion Darla S. Williamson 
for Sanctions 
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Date: 10/25/2013 
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Page 3 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal. 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User Judge 
11/30/2009 MEMO CCLATICJ Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Darla S. Williamson 
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Three-Day Notice of 
Intent to Take Default and in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions 
12/2/2009 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on Darla S. Williamson 
12/02/2009 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hel1 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Pages 2nd Motion 
12/4/2009 DEOP CCCHILER Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Darla S. Williamson 
Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion to Strike Three Day Notice of Intent to 
Take Default 
12/10/2009 NOTS CCWRIGRM Notice Of Service Darla S. Williamson 
12/15/2009 HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/21/2010 08:30 Darla S. Williamson 
AM) 
DCKORSJP Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Darla S. Williamson 
Further Proceedings 
12/21/2009 ANSW CCAMESLC Answer and Counterclaim (Williams for Berryhill & Darla S. Williamson 
Co, John and Amy Berryhill) 
12/24/2009 NOSV CCGARDAL Notice Of Service Darla S. Williamson 
1/5/2010 NOTO CCTOWI\IRD Notice Of Taking Deposition Darla S. Williamson 
1/11/2010 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Darla S. Williamson 
1/15/2010 STIP MCBIEHKJ Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Darla S. Williamson 
NOTS CCWRIGRM Notice Of Service Darla S. Williamson 
1/22/2010 RPLY CCLATICJ Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial Darla S. Williamson 
(Clark for Masell Equities) 
3/1/2010 NOTO MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Taking Deposition Darla S. Williamson 
3/11/2010 NOTO MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Taking Deposition Darla S. Williamson 
3/12/2010 MOTN CCTOWNRD Motion to Quash Notice of Deposition Darla S. Williamson 
NOHG CCTOWNRD Notice Of Hearing Darla S. Williamson 
HRSC CCTOWNRD Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/07/2010 02:45 Darla S. Williamson 
PM) Motion to Quash 
3/16/2010 NOTO CCTOWNRD Notice Of Taking Deposition Darla S. Williamson 
3/17/2010 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Darla S. Williamson 
3/22/2010 MOTN CCSULLJA Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Darla S. Williamson 
MEMO CCSULLJA Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Darla S. Williamson 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCSULLJA Affidavit of Glenn Masell Darla S. Williamson 
NOTH CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing (04/21/10@ 2:45pm) Darla S. Williamson 
HRSC CCWRIGRM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Darla S. Williamson 
04/21/2010 02:45 PM) Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
MOSJ CCWRIGRM Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment Darla S. Williamson 
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Date: 10/25/2013 
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Page 4 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal. 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User Judge 
3/22/2010 MEMO CCWRIGRM Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion Darla S. Williamson 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of John E Berryhill Darla S. Williamson 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Daniel E Williams Darla S. Williamson 
NOTH CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing (04/21/10@ 2:45pm) Darla S. Williamson 
3/26/2010 MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion to Compel Darla S. Williamson 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Daniel E Williams Darla S. Williamson 
MEMO MCBIEHKJ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Darla S. Williamson 
4/7/2010 HRVC DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion held on 04/07/2010 Darla S. Williamson 
02:45 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion to Quash 
NOTO MCBIEHKJ (2)Notice Of Taking Deposition Darla S. Williamson 
MOTI\I CCBOYIDR Motion to Amend Complaint to Include a Claim for Darla S. Williamson 
Punitive Damages 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum Filed in Support of it's Motion to Darla S. Williamson 
Amend Complaint to add a Claim for Punitive 
Damages 
RSPN CCBOYIDR Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Darla S. Williamson 
Summary Judgment 
OBJE CCBOYIDR *****Objection to Excerpts of the Affidavits of Gery Darla S. Williamson 
W. Edson, Robert A Renteria, and David C. 
Cooper****** (Pleading Entered in Error, Pleading 
Belongs in Case CVOC0915884) 
AFFD CCBOYIDR Affidavit of Glenn E. Mosell Filed in Oppostion to Darla S. Williamson 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
NOHG CCBOYIDR Notice Of Hearing (Motion to Amend Complaint to Darla S. Williamson 
Include a Claim for Punitive Damages 4-21-10@ 
2:45 PM) 
MEMO CCBOURPT Memorandum of Defendant in Opposition to Darla S. Williamson 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCBOURPT Affidavit In Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Darla S. Williamson 
partial Summary Judgment 
4/9/2010 NOTD MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Taking Deposition Darla S. Williamson 
4/13/2010 STIP DCKORSJP Stipulated Protective Order Darla S. Williamson 
4/14/2010 REPL CCMASTLW Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Darla S. Williamson 
Partial Summary Judgment 
MOTN CCMASTLW Motion for Protective Order Darla S. Williamson 
MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum in Support Darla S. Williamson 
MOTN CCMASTLW Motion to Strike Darla S. Williamson 
MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum in Support Darla S. Williamson 
REPL CCMASTLW Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Darla S. Williamson 
Judgment 
MOTN CCMASTLW Motion to Strike Darla S. Williamson 
MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum in Support Darla S. Williamson 
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Page 5 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court -Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
IVlosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal. 
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User 
4/14/2010 MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend 
Complaint 
4/20/2010 MEMO MCBIEHKJ Memorandum Filed in Oppositioin to Motion to 
Strike 
REPL MCBIEHKJ Reply Memorandum Filed in Support of Motion to 
Amend Complaint 
NOTD MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Taking Deposition 
MOTN CCLATICJ Motion to Supplement Record on Summary 
Judgment 
AFFD CCLATICJ Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams re Motion to 
Supplement Record on Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCLATICJ Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of John E. 
Berryhill Ill 
4/21/2010 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
04/21/2010 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Pages Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
4/27/2010 ORDR DCKORSJP Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel 
4/29/2010 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service 
4/30/2010 DEOP DCKORSJP Memorandum Decision & Order Re: Cros 
Motions for Summary Judgment, Motions to 
Strike, Motion to Amend Complaint & Motion to 
Compel 
5/7/2010 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service 
5/12/2010 MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion for Sanctions and to Vacate Trial Setting 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Daniel E Williams 
5/13/2010 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service 
AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Counsel Filed in Opposition to Motion 
for Sanctions 
5/14/2010 AFFD CCRANDJD Second Affidavit of Daniel Williams re Motion for 
Sanctions and to Vacate Trial Setting 
MOTN CCRANDJD Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Motion for 
Sanctions and to Vacate Trial Setting 
AFSM CCRANDJD Affidavit In Support Of Motion 
NOHG CCRANDJD Notice Of Hearing re Motion to Shorten Time 
(05.19.10@2:45pm) 
HRSC CCRANDJD Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/19/2010 02:45 
PM) Motion to Shorten Time on Motion for 
Sanctions 
5/17/2010 ORDR DCKORSJP Order Granting Motion to Shorten Time for 
Hearing on Defs Motion for Sanctions & to 
Vacate Trial Setting 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Judge 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
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Date: 10/25/2013 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 02:48 PM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 11 Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill _Company Inc, etal. 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User Judge 
5/18/2010 MEMO CCMCLILI Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Darla S. Williamson 
Defendants Motion for Sanctions & to Vacate 
Trial Setting 
MOTN CCMCLILI Mosell Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to Darla S. Williamson 
Plaintiffs Third Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents 
AFFD CCMCLILI Affidavit of Counsel Filed in Support of Mosell Darla S. Williamson 
Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to 
Plaintiffs Third Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents 
MEMO CCMCLILI Memorandum in Support of Mosell Equities' Darla S. Williamson 
Motion to Compel Responses to Plaintiffs Third 
Set of Requests for Production of Documents 
5/19/2010 NOHG CCLATICJ Notice Of Hearing re Mosell Equities' Motion to Darla S. Williamson 
Compel Discovery (06/09/10@ 2:45 pm) 
HRSC CCLATICJ Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Darla S. Williamson 
06/09/2010 02:45 PM) 
DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion held on 05/19/2010 Darla S. Williamson 
02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Pages Motion to 
Shorten Time on Motion for Sanctions 
5/21/2010 HRVC DCKORSJP Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/21/2010 Darla S. Williamson 
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/02/2010 08:30 Darla S. Williamson 
AM) 
DCKORSJP Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Darla S. Williamson 
Further Proceedings 
5/25/2010 NOHG CCSIMMSM Supplemental Notice Of Hearing (Motion to Darla S. Williamson 
Compel of Plaintiff's First, Second, and Third Sets 
of Discovery Requests 
MOTN CCSULLJA Mosell Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to Darla S. Williamson 
Plaintiffs First and Second Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents to 
Defendants 
AFFD CCSULLJA Affidavit of Counsel Filed in Support of Mosell Darla S. Williamson 
Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to 
Plaintiffs First and Second Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents to 
Defendants 
MEMO CCSULLJA Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Mosell Darla S. Williamson 
Equities' Motion to Compel Responses to 
Plaintiffs First and Second Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents to 
Defendants 
5/26/2010 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Darla S. Williamson 
6/2/2010 MOTN CCGARDAL Motion to Amend Complaint Darla S. Williamson 
MEMO CCGARDAL Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Darla S. Williamson 
000010
Date: 10/25/2013 
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Page 7 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal. 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User 
6/2/2010 NOHG CCGARDAL Notice Of Hearing 6.30.10 @ 2:45pm 
HRSC CCGARDAL Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend 
06/30/2010 02:45 PM) 
6/3/2010 AMEN CCWRIGRM Amended Notice of Taking the Deposition of 
Glenn Mosell 
6/7/2010 MEMO CCWRIGRM Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motions to Compel 
6/9/2010 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 
06/09/2010 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Jayleen Tillman 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Pages 
6/23/2010 AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Daniel E Williams 
MEMO CCWRIGRM Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion to File Second Amended 
Complaint 
6/25/2010 REPL CCSULLJA Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum Filed in Support of 
Its Motion to Amend Complaint 
6/30/2010 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion to Amend held on 
06/30/2010 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Pages 
7/2/2010 NOTS CCAMESLC Notice Of Service 
DEWI CCAMESLC Defendant's Witness List 
NOTS CCTOWNRD Notice Of Service 
MISC CCWRIGRM Mosell Equities Disclosure of Lay Witnesses for 
Trial 
7/12/2010 NOTC DCKORSJP Notice of PreTrial Conference 
HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
07/21/2010 02:45 PM) 
7/21/2010 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
07/21/2010 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 Pages 
HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine 
07/30/2010 09:00 AM) 
7/23/2010 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service 
7/26/2010 HRVC DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on 
07/30/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
7/29/2010 STIP CCKINGAJ Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Trial Date and 
Hearing Date 
8/2/2010 HRVC DCKORSJP Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/02/2010 
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Judge 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
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Page 8 of 11 
Fourth Judicial District Court -Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-0997 4 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal. 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User 
8/2/2010 HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/07/2010 08:30 
AM) 
8/4/2010 ORDR DCKORSJP Order to Vacate and Reset Trial Date and 
Hearing Date 
8/25/2010 MISC DCKORSJP PreTrial Order 
8/27/2010 MOTN CCSWEECE Defendants Motion In Limine 
MOTN CCSWEECE Plaintiffs Motion In Limine To Exclude Irrelevant 
Evidence: Other Litigation 
MOTN CCSWEECE Plaintiffs Motion In Limine To Exclude Irrelevant 
Evidence: Assignment Of Potential Proceeds As 
Collateral For Loan 
8/30/2010 MEMO CCSWEECE Defendants Memorandum In Opposition To 
Motion In Limine RE: Other Litigation 
8/31/2010 JRYI CCGARDAL Proposed Jury Instructions and Verdict Form 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine 
08/31/2010 01:30 PM) 
DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on 
08/31/2010 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel1 
Court Reporter: no court reporter 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
MISC MCBIEHKJ Defendants Special Verdict 
MISC MCBIEHKJ Requested Jury Instructions 
9/3/2010 BREF CCRANDJD Defendants Trial Brief 
MISC CCMASTLW Defendants' Supplemental Witness Disclosures 
9/7/2010 MISC CCNELSRF Mosell Equities' Disclosure Of Trial Exhibits 
DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/07/2010 
08:30AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Diane Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 Day 1 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/08/2010 09:00 
AM) Day 2 
9/8/2010 HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/09/2010 09:00 
AM) Day 3 
EXLT CCNELSRF Defendant's Exhibit List 
BREF CCNELSRF Trial Bench Brief: Admissibility of Extrinsic 
Evidence of Defendant's Prior Inconsistent 
Statement 
DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/08/2010 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:, NONE 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: ,NONE Day 2 
9/9/2010 HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/14/2010 09:00 
AM) Day4 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Judge 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
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Date: 10/25/2013 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 02:48 PM ROA Report 
Page 9 of 11 Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal. 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User Judge 
9/9/2010 DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/09/2010 Darla S. Williamson 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: ,None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: None .... Day 3 
9/13/2010 AFOS MCBIEHKJ (5)Affidavit Of Service of Subpoena Darla S. Williamson 
9/14/2010 HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/15/2010 09:00 Darla S. Williamson 
AM) Day 5 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/16/2010 09:00 Darla S. Williamson 
AM) Day 6 
DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/14/2010 Darla S. Williamson 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: , NONE 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: , NONE Day 4 
9/15/2010 DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/15/2010 Darla S. Williamson 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: None Day 5 
HRVC CCNELSRF Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/16/2010 Darla S. Williamson 
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated Day 6 
PLJI DCTYLENI Plaintiffs Requested Jury Instructions-Court Dennis E. Goff 
Modified and Filed 
OF.II DCTYLENI Defendants Requested Jury Instructions-Court Dennis E. Goff 
Modified and Filed 
JRYI CCNELSRF Jury Instructions Darla S. Williamson 
VERD CCNELSRF Verdict Form Darla S. Williamson 
9/17/2010 MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence Darla S. Williamson 
9/21/2010 MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Darla S. Williamson 
Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict or in the 
Alternative Motion for a New trial 
NOTH CCJOYCCN Notice Of Hearing (10/6/2010 at 9:00 a.m.) Darla S. Williamson 
HRSC CCJOYCCN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/06/2010 09:00 Darla S. Williamson 
AM) Motion for JNOV, and in the Alternative, 
Motion for New Trial 
9/29/2010 MEMO CCSIMMSM Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Darla S. Williamson 
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, or in the Alternative, Motion for new 
Trial 
10/1/2010 MEMO CCSULLJA Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Darla S. Williamson 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial 
10/4/2010 CONT DCTYLENI Continued (Motion 10/07/2010 03:00 PM) Dennis E. Goff 
Motion for .INOV, and in the Alternative, Motion 
for New Trial 
AMEN DCTYLENI Amended l\lotice of Hearing (10/7/10@ 3:00 Dennis E. Goff 
p.m.) 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-0997 4 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill Company Inc, etal. 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Masell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill 111, Amy Berryhill 
Date 
10/7/2010 
10/26/2010 
10/29/2010 
11/4/2010 
11/5/2010 
11/10/2010 
11/23/2010 
12/2/2010 
12/6/2010 
12/17/2010 
1/10/2011 
9/6/2011 
10/4/2011 
10/28/2011 
11/3/2011 
11/21/2011 
12/21/2011 
3/1/2013 
Code 
DCHH 
ORDR 
HRSC 
MOTN 
MEMO 
OBJC 
AFFD 
HRVC 
ORDR 
ROST 
APSC 
NOTC 
.IDMT 
INAC 
STAT 
NOTC 
MOTN 
NOTH 
HRSC 
STIP 
HRVC 
MISC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
MISC 
User 
TCJOHNKA 
DCTYLENI 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
CCRANDJD 
CCRANDJD 
CCKINGAJ 
CCKINGAJ 
DCKORSJP 
DCTYLENI 
CCRANDJD 
CCLUNDMJ 
CCHOLMEE 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCWRIGRM 
CCWRIGRM 
CCWRIGRM 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
CCWATSCL 
CCWATSCL 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCTHIEBJ 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/07/2010 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: No reporter 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on Count 1 of Its 
Complaint 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 11/10/2010 02:45 
PM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Motion to Amend/Correct Order 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend 
Correct Order 
Judge 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Objection & Opposition to Defenant's Motion to Darla S. Williamson 
Amend/Correct Order 
Affidavit of Eric R Clark Filed in Opposition to Darla S. Williamson 
Defendant's Motion to CorrecUAmend Order 
Hearing result for Status held on 11/10/2010 Darla S. Williamson 
02:45 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Order of Clarification Dennis E. Goff 
Request for Trial Setting Darla S. Williamson 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Darla S. Williamson 
Notice of Cross Appeal 
Judgment 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Inactive (Stayed Pending Decision on SC Appeal) Darla S. Williamson 
STATUS CHANGED: inactive Dennis E. Goff 
Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court 
Docket No. 38338 
Defendants Motion to Amend Transcript on 
Appeal 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendants Motion to 
Amend Transcript Appeal 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
11/30/2011 02:45 PM) 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Darla S. Williamson 
Stipulated Order to Amend Transcript on _Appeal Lynn G Norton 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Lynn G Norton 
on 11/30/2011 02:45 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Estimated Cost of Amended Appeal Transcript Darla S. Williamson 
Notice of Payment Estimated of Amended Appeal Darla S. Williamson 
Transcript 
(2) Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Darla S. Williamson 
Docket No. 38338 
Opinion - Supreme Court Docket No. 38338 Darla Williamson 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2009-09974 Current Judge: Darla S. Williamson 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill _Company Inc, etal. 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Mosell Equities LLC vs. Berryhill & Company Inc, John E Berryhill Ill, Amy Berryhill 
Date Code User Judge 
3/28/2013 REMT CCTHIEBJ Remittitur-Reversed Supreme Court Docket No. Darla Williamson 
38338 
4/24/2013 STIP MCBIEHKJ Stipulation for Scheduling After Appeal and District Court Clerk 
Remand 
5/1/2013 NOHG CCNELSRF Notice Of Hearing District Court Clerk 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/11/2013 10:00 District Court Clerk 
AM) for New Trial After Remand 
5/3/2013 MEMO CCVIDASL Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for District Court Clerk 
New Trial Following Appeal Remand 
6/4/2013 MEMO CCMEYEAR Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion District Court Clerk 
for New trial Following Appeal and Remand 
AFFD CCMEYEAR Affidavit of Chris Pierce in Support of Defendants' District Court Clerk 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion 
for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand 
6/11/2013 MOTN CCHEATJL Motion To Strike Defendants' Memorandum In District Court Clerk 
Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For New Trial 
Following Remand 
NOHG CCHEATJL Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For New Trial After District Court Clerk 
Remand (July 11 2013@10am) 
6/17/2013 MEMO CCMARTJD Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for New District Court Clerk 
Trial 
7/3/2013 MEMO CCMARTJD Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike District Court Clerk 
7/11/2013 DCHH TCLYCAAM Hearing result for Motion scheduled on District Court Clerk 
07/11/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: for New Trial After Remand 
7/18/2013 ROST CCMARTJD Plaintiffs Request for Trial Setting After Remand District Court Clerk 
From the Supreme Court 
REQU CCSCOTDL Plaintiffs Request for Trial Setting After remand District Court Clerk 
from the Supreme Court 
7/23/2013 RESP CCNELSRF Defs Response To Plfs Plaintiffs Request for District Court Clerk 
Trial Setting After remand from the Supreme 
Court 
REPL CCNELSRF Plfs Reply to Defs Response To Plfs Plaintiffs District Court Clerk 
Request for Trial Setting After remand from the 
Supreme Court 
8/19/2013 DEOP DCLYKEMA Memorandum Decision and Order Dennis E. Goff 
8/20/2013 ORDR DCLYKEMA Order Granting New Trial Dennis E. Goff 
8/22/2013 MISC CCHEAT,IL Plaintiffs Unavailable Dates For Trial Dennis E. Goff 
APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Dennis E. Goff 
NOTA CCTHIEBJ NOTICE OF APPEAL Dennis E. Goff 
9/5/2013 AMEN CCTHIEBJ Amended Notice of Appeal Dennis E. Goff 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: 208-830-8084 
Fax: 208-939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAY O 3 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK. 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST ATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL FOLLOWING 
APPEAL AND REMAND 
Judge Dennis Goff 
After reversing Judge Goffs grant of Mosell Equities' Motion for JNOV, the Supreme Court 
has remanded this case to Judge Goff and has directed the Court to decide Mosen Equities• Motion for 
New Trial. Fortunately, for Mosen Equities, the evidence is equally compelling to support granting a 
Motion for New Trial. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
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SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The Supreme Court reversed this Court on its decision granting JNOV, and consequently, the 
facts stated in the Supreme Court's opinion were consistent with a JNOV standard. "The party making 
the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict necessarily admits the truth of all of the opposing 
party's evidence and every legitimate inference that could be drawn from that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the opposing party. Mosell Equities v. Berryhill, Doc. No. 38338 (2013), p. 7, citing Quick v. 
Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). However, on Remand, this Court is not constrained 
to apply that standard. 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court identified the standard Judge Goff is to apply when 
considering Mosen Equities' Motion for New Trail. 
"A trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground [insufficiency of the evidence] if, 
after making his or her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing 
the evidence, the judge determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight 
of the evidence." 
Mosell Equities v. Berryhill, Doc. No. 38338 (2013), p. 13, quoting Hudelson v. Delta Intern. Mach. 
Corp., 142 Idaho 244,248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005). 
Unlike the Supreme Court, which literally considered every word Berryhill stated as a true fact, 
regardless of his contradictory statements or the conflicting evidence, this Court is entitled to render its 
opinion based on the Court's own assessment of the credibility of witnesses and after weighing the 
evidence. Furthermore, on review if another appeal ensues, this Court's opinion is subject to review as 
an abuse of discretion. "Decisions within the discretion of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a showing of clear and manifest abuse of discretion." Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 
181 P.3d 435,438, (2007). 
As Mosell Equities argued to the Supreme Court and now again on remand, Judge Goff was 
correct in concluding, first, that John Berryhill was not credible, and second, that the clear weight of the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
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evidence1 established the parties agreed Mosen Equities would loan money to Berryhill & Company, 
which at some future time may be applied to fund Mosen Equities' "buy-in" if the parties could agree to 
terms. In its briefing, Mosell Equities cited extensively to the actual trial testimony and exhibits, so the 
Supreme Court fully evaluated the evidence presented at trial. If the Supreme Court, on remand, did not 
believe this record would support a decision by Judge Goff that the clear weight of the evidence 
established there was a contract that Berryhill breached, then why would the Supreme Court remand the 
case for Judge Goff s consideration and opinion? Mosell Equities believes this Court was therefore 
right the first time, and Mosen Equities is entitled to a new trial. The Supreme Court simply was 
concerned with upholding the JNOV based on the applicable standard. 
I. JUDGE GOFF WAS CORRECT-JOHN BERRYIDLL WAS NOT CREDIBLE 
Several times during the trial, Judge Goff had to admonish Berryhill and direct him to answer the 
questions asked. "The attorney asks the question, you cannot reword the question. You have to answer 
the question and not volunteer answers; okay? I put up with it yesterday for several hours, I'm not 
putting up with it today." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 529, L. 13-16. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 578, L. 4-24. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 727, L. 
15 top. 728, L. 4. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 731, L. 18-23. 
Ultimately, in his oral ruling, Judge Goff, although being diplomatic, found that Berryhill was 
not credible. 
[JNOV Tr., p. 91] 
17 ... And the Law talks about the 
10 probative values and - - rather, the requisite standard is 
19 whether the evidence is sufficient of quality and 
20 probative value that reasonable minds could reach the 
21 same conclusion as did the jury/ 
22 So, when I analyze this, and based really 
23 upon Counsels' arguments today, it seemed to me, in 
24 trial and during the arguments today, that Berryhill 
1 On Appeal Mosen Equities argued this Court had granted Mosen Equities' Motion For New Trial, but the Supreme Court 
focused on the Court's Supplemental Order where Judge Goff stated the Motion For New Trial issue was "moot." 
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25 wants to only take one side or one edge of the sword. If 
P.92 
1 you call something a loan in your handwriting, and 
2 you put in our own - and instruct your own staff to 
3 insert it, whether you're a taxpayer, or for tax 
4 purposes, or for whatever, as a loan, than how can you 
5 not take the other side of the - - the deal that it is a 
6 loan. And that has bothered me from day one. 
The great weight of the evidence established the plain language Berryhill used in Exhibit 1 
confirmed the parties intended the funds to be loans and, that if they later agreed to buy-in terms, at that 
time the funds would transition to equity. Mosell clearly expressed his understanding of the agreement 
when he wrote "loan" conspicuously on the checks2 he provided to Berryhill. And, Berryhill confirmed 
his understanding the funds were and remained as loaned funds by accounting for these funds as loans 
on his company's books, pending the completion of the "buy-in" documents by Berryhill's attorneys, 
and by acknowledging the parties intent the funds were loans in purchase documents Berryhill's attorney 
drafted. Berryhill's testimony that he understood the money was something other than a loan, pending 
the "buy-in" was simply not credible. 
II. THE VERDICT FINDING NO EXPRESS CONTRACT WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE 
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
In addition to identifying Berryhill's lack of credibility, Judge Goff was correct that the clear 
weight of the evidence established the parties intended the funds to remain a loan pending the 
finalization of the buy-in terms. "The conduct of the parties to a contract and their practical 
interpretation of it is an important factor when there is a dispute over its meaning." Mountainview 
Landowners Co-Op. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 865, 136 P.3d 332,336, (2006). 
2 The Supreme Court erroneously concluded two of the checks were not marked loan. However, the October 9, 2007 check, 
the Supreme Court claimed said, "Kitchen equipment" really said, "Kitchen Equip Loan." A copy of all of the checks as 
marked for admission at trial is attached. 
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A. Loan Meant "Loan" And The Great Weigh Of The Evidence Confirms Berryhill's Understanding 
The Funds Received From Mosell Equities Were Loans. 
The phrase "This is a loan ... " or the term "loan" written on Mosell Equities' checks was not 
ambiguous. 
The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous on its face must be decided by 
giving the words or phrases used their ordinary meanings. Shawver v. Huckleberry 
Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho, 354, 93 P.3d 685 (2004). A party's subjective, undisclosed 
interpretation of a word or phrase cannot make the contract ambiguous. If it could, then 
all contracts would be rendered ambiguous merely by a party asserting a 
misunderstanding of the meaning of one or more of the words used." 
"The intent of the parties is determined from the plain meaning of the words." Clear 
Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d 443, 
446 (2005). A contract is not rendered ambiguous on its face because one of the 
parties thought that the words used had some meaning that differed from the 
ordinary meaning of those words. As explained in 17 A Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 348 
(2004): 
If the language used by the parties is plain, complete, and unambiguous, the intention of 
the parties must be gathered from that, language, arid from that language alone, no matter 
what the actual or secret intentions of the parties may have been. Presumptively, the 
intent of the parties to a contract is expressed by the natural and ordinary meaning of their 
language referable to it, and such meaning cannot be perverted or destroyed by the courts 
through construction, for the parties are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly 
state. Only when the language of the contract is ambiguous may a court tum to extrinsic 
evidence of the contracting parties' intent. 
Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748, 752, (2007) (Emphasis Added).) 
In its Decision, the Supreme Court found that based on Berryhill's own self-serving testimony, 
(applying the JNOV review standard) the Jury could have found that "loan" really meant something 
related to "tax purposes." 
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Berryhill, the jury could have found that the word "loan" in 
Exhibit 1 and on the checks had a special meaning other than what would be its ordinary 
meaning. That special meaning was that it was just a label for tax purposes. The payments 
were to create the downtown restaurant and other facilities in order to help convince others to 
invest in Polo Cove, and therefore the payments related to moving the restaurant downtown 
and constructing the tenant improvements in both the originally leased space and in the 
expansion were simply sums spent to market the Polo Cove development. 
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Masell Equities v. Berryhill, Doc. No. 38338 (2013), p. 8. 
However, as discussed at length below, Berryhill provided no evidence to support his "it really 
meant tax purposes" version. Moreover, there was no evidence to support Berryhill's claim Mosell 
Equities gave Berryhill $405,000.00 which Berryhill got to keep if Polo Cove did not materialize, which 
appears to be what the Supreme Court is stating. The reality is no reasonable businessman would have 
"done that deal," and the Supreme Court fails to cite to any evidence, other than Berryhill's testimony, 
to support its conclusions. 
B. The Evidence Was Undisputed That Berryhill Treated Mosell Equities' Money As A Loan. 
On June 28, 2007 Glenn Mosell wrote Check No. 5127 to "Berryhill & Co." for $50,000.00 and 
wrote "loan" conspicuously on the "memo" line of that check. (Exhibits 1 and 2.) 
Berryhill then took that check and made a copy. Below the copy of the check, Berryhill wrote, 
"This is a loan .... " He concluded with the statement, "It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's 'buy 
in' of MoBerry Ventures Corp. Inc." Both Berryhill and Mosell signed the agreement. (Exhibit 1.) 
-- ·-· -- - - - - -
MOSEtL EQLITIES LLC 
/-It) 15('11. l~ 
!: It,,{_,~ t l~ ti;e,: ... 
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Mosell testified the he hand delivered each check, (Exhibits 1-11 ), to Berryhill and Berryhill 
accepted each check. Tr. Vol. I, p. 230, L. 1 top. 339, L. 2. 
Joy Luedtke was the the General Manager and bookkeeper for Berryhill & Co. from October 
2007 through October 2008. Luedtke said she became the General Manager in October 2007, after 
Mosell Equities had already provided over $200,000.00 to Berryhill & Co. Luedtke recalled what when 
she received a check in October 2007 she created a bookkeeping "equity" account for Mosell Equities 
because she thought Mosell and Berryhill "were already partners." She testified that Mosell approached 
her and asked her to correct the error and to place the money in the long-term liability account that 
Berryhill has already created regarding the Mosell Equities' loans. Luedtke confirmed that she made the 
correction after she "cleared it with John [Berryhill]." Tr. Vol. I, p. 268, L. 9, top. 270, L. 7. 
Luedtke testified that she as the Berryhill & Co. bookkeeper always accounted for the money 
received from Mosell Equities as a loan to Berryhill & Co and did so after verifying that doing so was 
appropriate with Berryhill and with Amy Dempsey, CPA, Berryhill & Co's accountant. Tr. Vol. I, p. 
268, L. 9 to p. 270, L. 7. 
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Luedtke also testified that Exhibit 53 was in error. Tr. Vol. I, p. 271, L. 2 top. 272, L. 7. As of 
June 2008, Berryhill & Co. was correctly reporting Mosell Equities' contributions of $385,000.00 as 
long-term liabilities (debt), but the figure should have been the full $405,000.00 paid as of June 2008. 
Long Tenn U.billtlell 
C fei!~::!~c~al Loan-oee I 
Crty of Boise SEWER. Bro.idwily 
Ctty of Boise SEWER • Downtown 
Total Long Term Liabilities 
Total L1abiht1es 
(Excerpt from Exhibit 53.) 
~:~::~ :=> 
5.208 11 
9 039 12 
505.041 74 
736.~46 22 
-50,000.00 
Luedtke stated that had the buy-in occurred, she would have made an accounting entry closing 
out the Mosell Equities' long-term liability [loan] account and creating an "equity" account reflecting 
Mosell Equities' ownership interest, but that she never was asked to make any such changes. Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 275, L. 4-9. 
When Mosell approached Berryhill in September 2008 regarding Mosell Equities' money, 
Luedtke explained that she had conversations with Berryhill about Mosell's request and that she and 
Berryhill reviewed and considered possible sources of repayment of Mosell Equities' loaned funds. Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 284, L. 8-24. 
Luedtke also stated that Berryhill never told her, at any time while she was the Berryhill & Co. 
general manager, that Berryhill disputed Berryhill & Co. owed the money to Mosell Equities or that 
Berryhill asserted Mosell Equities' money was not a loan. Tr. Vol. I, p. 285, L. 3-5. 
Amy Dempsey, Berryhill & Co.'s CPA, responded to Berryhill's inquiry regarding the Mosell 
Equities' money in an e-mail dated March 5, 2008 and referred to Mosell Equities' money "on the 
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books" as a loan. (Exhibit 37.) This e-mail contradicted her testimony at trial that Dempsey really did 
not know what the funds were. 
>--··· Ori~innl Mcssa~c -----
>From: Amy Dcmp:.cy <amvra!taxguv:-.cc-----.. 
>To: John Berryhill 
>Cc: Glenn Moscll <moscl({(i.:mac.com>: Glenn Moscll <moscll-0:·all.nel> 
>Sent: Wed Mar 05 06:06:24 2008 
>Subject: RE: Mee1ing next week? 
> 
>Hi John? 
>No problem! As far as a IO am meeting I have Thursday the 6th available or Friday the 
14th. If your mnin concern is setting up the partnership in 2007 vs. 20081 do not think it 
\.,.·ill make much difference. If you chose to continue to set it up in 2007 then Glenn 
would receive a K.·1 from Hcrryh11l, 1tyou chose to set the buy-in in 2008 then we would 
just leave the monies Gleim donated in 2007 on the books a.'i a loan and then reclass the 
loon amounts that are associated \\ith the buy-in to his capital account in 2008. 
Other than Berryhill's self-serving testimony, there was no evidence to support Berryhill's 
contention "loan" was just a label for tax purposes as the Supreme Court claimed the Jury could have 
believed. Moreover, not a single document or witnesses corroborated Berryhill's claim he or anyone for 
that matter meant the term "loan" was only used for "tax purposes." In fact, every witness, even 
Berryhill' s own restaurant managers, accountant and attorneys, contradicted this claim. 
Mosell testified he asked Berryhill to write the note in Exhibit 1 as "security for my "50,000.00 
check," that Mosell believed the funds remained a loan because that was the agreement and Berryhill 
accounted for Mosell Equities' funds as debt on the Berryhill & Co. books. Tr. Vol. I, p. 315, L. 3, top. 
318, L. 11. Mosell denied any agreement to use the term "loan" for some tax purposes, and Berryhill 
failed to provide any testimony, lay or expert, to support his contention that writing "loan" on the checks 
and on Exhibit 1 would have some tax benefit to either Mosell Equities or Berryhill. 
Thereafter, over the next ten months, Glenn Mosell personally delivered nine other checks, 
which Mosell Equities asserted at trial constituted the funds for Mosell Equities' buy-in of half of 
Berryhill & Co. Mosell testified that he understood the the money would remain as a loan pending the 
transition to an ownership interest. 
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P. 317 [Mosen Testifying] 
10 Q. Did the - did the buy-in ever occur 
11 mister - Mr. Mosell? 
12 A. It did not. 
13 Q. Okay. Was it part of the deal that -
14 well, you said it was a loan, and then what was your 
15 understanding of the trans - the transition? 
16 A. I would make loans to the company, the loans 
• 
17 would be recorded on the company books. And they would 
18 either be repaid to me, as a loan would be, or that loan 
19 would be converted to equity or stock in Berryhill & 
20 Company, and that was the understanding. 
Mosell testified he wrote "loan" on the checks because at the time he and Berryhill were 
contemplating the buy-in an attorney, Kim Gourley, was working on the documents that provided 
Mosell Equities would pay $387,000.00 for 50% of Berryhill & Co., and because Berryhill had found 
the downtown restaurant space, Berryhill asked Mosell to "front the money." Tr. Vol. I, p. 230, L. 10 to 
p. 235, L. 17 and p. 237, L. 3 to p. 239, L. 2. 
Mosell also testified that the first time he heard that Berryhill was disputing the funds were a 
loan was in response to a demand for repayment sent to Mosell Equities' attorney in April 2009. Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 318, L. 19 top. 320, L. 8. 
C. The Meier Documents Confirmed Berryhill's Understanding The Funds Were A Loan 
Attorney Meier drafted certain corporate documents after meeting with Mosell and Berryhill in 
January 2008. (Exhibit 35.) Mosell testified that Meier advised a simpler approach was to eliminate 
"MoBerry, Inc." Tr. Vol. I, p. 249, L. 14 top. 251, L. 6. Based on Mosell and Berryhill's discussions 
with Meier, she drafted several corporate documents that identified her understanding of what had 
transpired between Mosell and Berryhill as of their meeting in January 2008. 
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Special Meeting of the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. 
SPF.CIAL MEETING OF THE 
BOARD 01;· DIRECTORS AND SHAREIIOLDER.S 
Effective the December 31. 2007 
The undc.rsigned, being Secretal)' of BERRYHTTJ. & COMPANY, l1'C .• an Idaho 
corporatiOfl (the ''Company'"). by this instrument evidences 1he actions and resolutions undertaken 
at the special meeting of the Board of Directors and Shareholders of the Company. Pre~nt was 
the sole Shareholder and the Directors who waived notice of the meeting 
WHEREAS, the Comp~ny has borrowed Fol!r Hunued Thousand Dollars from Glenn E. 
Mose II for the funding of lhc relocation of the Company· s re.;taurant to a ne-w location and for the 
capittl improvements to te made to the restaurant and banquet rooms. 
WHEREAS, Glenn E. Mos.ell desires to acquire an interest in the Company in e,cchan~ 
for. and as repaym~nt of, the amount lent to the Company. 
Stock Purchase Document 
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (hereinafter "Agreement") is made and entered into 
effective the __ day of-----~· 2007, by and between BERRYHILL & COMPANY, 
INC., an Idaho corporation (the "Corporation"), and GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man dealing with 
his separate property ("Mosell"). 
\\' I TN E S SETH: 
WHEREAS, John Berryhill (the "Shareholder") is the sole shareholder and record owner of two 
hundred (200) shares, $1 .00 par val u.e. of the issued and outstanding common ca pilaf stock of BERRYHll.L 
& ffiMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation (hereinafter tbe "C.orporation"). John Berryhill's shares represent 
one hundred percent ( I 00%) of the issued and outstanding common capital stock of the Corporation and are 
evidenced by Certificates No. I and No. 2. 
WHEREAS, during the calendar year of 2007. Mosel! loaned the Comoration Four Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($4001000) to fund the relocation of the Corporation's restaurant and for capital 
improvements needed for the Corporation's restaurant and banquet room~ 
WHEREAS. the Corporation desires to issue two hundred <2001 shares of the Corporation's 
common capital stock. to Mosell as repayment of the Loan. Mosell desires to accept the two hundred 
(200) shares of the Corporation's common capital stock as repayment of the Loan and to h.nve the Loan 
r~classified on die Corporation's books and records as a capilal comribulion f rum Mosell. 
WHEREAS. after tl1e execution of this Agreement, Masell and the Shan~J1older will e.ach own 
fifty percent (.50%) of lhe common capital stock of the Corporation. 
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Satisfaction of Loan Doument 
SATISFACTION OF LOAN 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that GLENN E. MOSELL, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property, does hereby certify and declare that the certain Loan 
in the original amount of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000) mode and entered into by 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, an Idaho corporation, as ··borrower .. , to GLENN E. MOSELL, 
as .. ,ender", is fully paid, satisfied and discharged. 
DATED: _____ , 200_. 
Glem1 E. Mosell 
The "buy-in" terms identified and confirmed in the Meier documents were consistent with 
Berryhill's testimony in the Broadway Park case that Mosell Equities had already paid in the required 
funds and all that was left was to sign the appropriate documents. Tr. Vol. I, p. 445, L. 4 top. 448, L. 
13. 
[Pg. 447.] [Reading Berryhill's testimony in the Broadway Park case.] 
MR. CLARK: Thank you, "your Honor." 
16 Q. BY MR. CLARK: So, let- let ne move down. 
11 So, what would - what are the approximate 
18 total amounts of these payments? 
19 Ques - or answer: A little under 
20 half-million dollars. 
21 For these - for ease of discussion, 
22 I'm going to call it 500,000, but I'm not -
23 I'm noting that you said it's slightly under. 
24 Answer - your answer: Okay. 
25 What did Mosell Equities get in exchange 
[Pg. 447.] 
1 for this half million dollars? 
2 Berryhill's answer: 50 percent of 
3 Berryhill & Company. 
4 So, to - and question: So, today 
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5 Mosen Equities owns 50 percent of 
6 Berryhill & Company? 
7 Answer, there's - actually, no. The 
8 paperwork is being drawn up. 
9 Question: But that's your understanding? 
10 Answer: Yes. 
H So, he's - or Mosen Equities is going 
12 to be a 50 percent shareholder? 
13 Yes. 
• 
Mosen testified that he had agreed to increase the buy-in figure to $400,000.00, which Meier 
indicated in her documents. Tr. Vol. I, p. 251, L 7 to p. 256, L. 16. 
After the Meier meeting in January 2008, the owners in the Broadway Park case deposed 
Mosen, who testified in that case the funds were a loan that were to be converted, but if the conversion 
did not occur, Mosen was to receive his money back. Mosen also confirmed Berryhill was present at 
Mosen's deposition, which occurred a week after Berryhill's Broadway Park deposition, and that 
Berryhill never questioned Mosen's testimony. 
[Mosell testifying] 
1. Q. Did you testify regarding your understanding 
2 of whether or not the funds were a loan or not? 
3 A. Yes. I stated that there was a loan to 
4 Berryhill & Company to be converted to 50 percent cash, 
5 but if we did not consummate that, then I would receive 
6 my cash back. 
7 Q. And was Mr. Berryhill in the room with 
8 you--
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. - at that time? 
11 And after your deposition, did Mr. Berryhill 
12 indicate to you, in any manner, that he didn't believe 
13 your testimony was correct? 
14 A. He did not. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 259, L. 1-14. 
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Berryhill also claimed he refused to sign the Meier documents because the documents were not 
correct. However, Berryhill could not identify what he believed was missing from or needed to be 
added to the Meier documents to represent what Berryhill believed were the terms of the agreement. Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 452, 1. 18 top. 456, L. 14. Although he had numerous opportunities at trial, Berryhill never 
claimed that the "loan" language in the Meier documents, which were drafted by his own attorney, was 
incorrect, or that it really meant for "tax purposes." 
D. The Polo Cove Project Was A Distant Dream 
Berryhill claimed that the move downtown and everything else he did was all related to "Polo 
Cove." However, when asked about the terms of any alleged agreement between Mosell or Mosell 
Equities and John Berryhill or Berryhill & Co, Berryhill conceded there were no terms to the alleged 
contract. 
P470 [Berryhill testifying] 
15. Q. What was your agreement? That's what I'm 
16 trying to get to you. 
17 A. Polo Cove. 
18 Q. Well, okay. You both had an agreement about 
19 Polo Cove. What were the terms of the agreement about 
20 Polo Cove? 
21 A. There was nothing written down. 
22 Q. Okay. So, you had an agreement about 
23 Polo Cove with no terms? 
24 A. That's correct. 
Berryhill also admitted that Mosell never promised or guaranteed the success of Polo Cove, 
which was but one of the opportunities Berryhill documented in his vision. (Exhibit 18.) 
P475 [Berryhill testifying] 
15 Q. Okay. You're not - you're not contending 
16 and - and you're fair, in your deposition you answered 
17 this correctly - or succinctly. And I asked you 
18 point blank, do you believe Mr. Mosell or Mos -
19 Mosell Equities guaranteed to you the success of 
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20 Polo Cove or anything that was associated with 
21 Polo Cove? 
22 A. No. 
Between 2005 and February 2007 Mosen Equities paid Berryhill $25,000.00 for his consulting 
work on the Polo Cove project. (Exhibits 12-15.) 
The Berryhill Restaurant [Downtown] had its grand opening in August 2007, and Berryhill 
testified in the Broadway Park litigation in January 2008, that he had "pushed back" from the Polo Cove 
Project and had not worked on Polo Cove for the last six months. Tr. Vol. I, p. 534, L. 2 top. 535, L. 
24. 
Notwithstanding Berryhill's admission that Mosell never promised or guaranteed the success of 
Polo Cove, or the fact that Mosell Equities paid Berryhill $25,000.00 for consulting, or the fact that 
Berryhill admitted he had not been working on the Polo Cove project for the last half of 2007, Berryhill 
presented evidence at trial that his "name" and "reputation" somehow added value to the failed Polo 
Cove project. However, Berryhill ultimately conceded that even his "name" could not save or 
resuscitate the project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 733, L. 10 top. 734 , L. 11. 
Robert Taunton, who has a master's degree in land planning, and who has 30 years experience in 
land development, testified that he was involved in the Polo Cove project as a consultant. Tr. Vol. I, p. 
195, L. 11 top. 196, L 3. Mr. Taunton testified that he believed Polo Cove was a "viable project," and 
he could not blame anyone for the lack of the project's success. Tr. Vol. I, p. 201, L. 25 top. 203, L. 19. 
Mr. Taunton, also testified that he did not get the impression or have any belief that the only reason the 
Berryhill & Co. restaurant was moved downtown was to further the Polo Cove project as Berryhill 
contended. Tr. Vol. I, p. 205, L. 18-22. 
The reality, Polo Cove was a great idea. However, like many other development ventures at the 
time, it was a victim of the economic collapse in 2008. While there were some high-quality 
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prospectuses, (Exhibits 44 and 45), Mr. Taunton confirmed the project never broke ground. Tr. Vol. I, p. 
202, L. 20 top. 203, L. 19. 
On January 30, 2008, during his deposition in the Broadway Park case, Berryhill answered 
questions regarding the Mosell-Berryhill relationship and potential sources for payment for purchasing 
the Broadway Park center. Specifically, Berryhill testified that he recognized Polo Cove was an 
"amoeba" and "ever changing." Tr. Vol. I, p. 458, L. 1-14. Berryhill also testified that as of January 
2008, Berryhill had "pushed away" for the last six months and was not directly involved in the Polo 
Cove project. Tr. Vol. I, p. 534, L. 2 top. 535, L. 24. 
Judge Goff, when deciding the post-trial motions and after hearing the testimony and analyzing 
all of the evidences, stated, "Well, Polo Cove is really nothing. It was a dream in the first place .... " 
JNOV Tr. p. 18, L. 7-8. 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court, without citing to the record, stated: 
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Berryhill, the jury could have found that the word "loan" 
in Exhibit 1 and on the checks had a special meaning other than what would be its ordinary 
meaning. That special meaning was that it was just a label for tax purposes. The payments 
were to create the downtown restaurant and other facilities in order to help convince others to 
invest in Polo Cove, and therefore the payments related to moving the restaurant downtown 
and constructing the tenant improvements in both the originally leased space and in the 
expansion were simply sums spent to market the Polo Cove development. 
Mosell Equities v. Berryhill, Doc. No. 38338 (2013), p. 8. 
During oral argument, Mosell Equities Counsel asked Justice Eismann what reasonable person 
would simply give someone $405,000.00 to build a restaurant and expect compensation only if a 
speculative venture that had not even broke ground came to fruition in the distant future? Judge Eismann 
did not respond. Obviously, there was no reasonable response, other than a concession that no sensible 
person would have done such a thing. Even Berryhill admitted he did not believe Mosell Equities was 
simply giving him the $405,000.00. 
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P. 482 [by Mr. Clark- Berryhill Testifying] 
4 Q. Did you tell Mr. Berry - or Mr. Mosell that 
5 if there's no transition to the buy-in, that you got to 
6 keep the money that he had given you? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. And- but he asked for it back? 
9 A. No, he didn't. 
10 Q. He didn't ask for the money back? 
11 A. No. Not until the lawsuit. 
12 Q. There wasn't a letter from Mr. Berryhill -
13 Mr. Mosell's Counsel in Jan -January or February 
14 of '09? 
15 A. Initial -- that was the start of the 
16 lawsuit. That's what I'm referring to. 
17 Q. Was - was that the - what you consider the 
18 lawsuit? 
19 A. That was the start of it, yes. 
20 Q. And - and you, in response, denied that the 
21 funds were ever a loan, and denied any liability, and 
22 refused to pay Mr. Mosell back. 
23 A. That's correct. They were never a loan. 
24 Q. Okay. Let me ask you then, what those were 
25 funds, in your mind? 
P. 483 [by Mr. Clark] 
1 He was buying into my business. 
While the Supreme Court concluded based on application of the standard for JNOV, that the 
moving party concedes all adverse evidence, a standard which is not applicable to this motion, Berryhill 
statement "loan" really meant "tax purposes," the Court failed to consider that not a shred of evidence 
supported Berryhill's claim. Additionally, Berryhill testified Exhibits 19-21 were Berryhill's 
"negotiations" with Glenn Mosell regarding the terms of their relationship. Nothing in these documents 
however indicates that the "buy-in" was in any manner contingent upon the success of Polo Cove or any 
of the other potential opportunities that Berryhill and Mosell were considering as listed in Exhibit 18. 
Again, there was absolutely no evidence to support the Supreme Court's conclusion Glenn Mosell 
intended to just give Berryhill $405,000.00 to "market" Polo Cove. 
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ID. THE VERDICT FINDING BERRYHILL HAD NOT BREACHED AN EXPRESS CONTRACT 
WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
The Court must also address whether there was a breach based on the jury verdict form, an easy issue 
as Berryhill admits in his Appeal Brief that if there was a loan transaction, which the great weight of the 
evidence established, then Berryhill breached. 
"The jury quite simply found that, in determining the parties' intent, there was no simple 
loan transaction intended, which was clearly within their providence to do. If they had 
found a loan was intended, they would doubtless have found a breach in answer to 
Question No. 1 on the Special Verdict. (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, LL 20-23) and damages in 
some amount in answer to Question No. 2. Appellant's Brief, p. 30. (Emphasis added) 
Obviously, if a party to a loan denies the loan exists, as did Berryhill, and refuses to repay the 
funds, there is a breach, as Berryhill concedes in his Appeal Brief. 
Additionally, while Berryhill testified in the Broadway Park case Mosell Equities was "buying 
into my business," Berryhill received $405,000 from Mosell Equities' and Mosell Equities received 
nothing. Once again, if Mosell Equities was "buying into my business," and that buy-in was not 
completed, what legal basis does Berryhill have to keep the money? During cross examination, Mosell 
testified there was no "transition" because when he approached Berryhill about converting the funds to 
stock in Berryhill & Co., "John Berryhill denied the conversion. So they [the loaned funds] remained a 
loan." Tr. Vol. I, p. 323, L. 19-24. 
Berryhill conceded at trial that he understood Mosell Equities did not intend to just give the 
money to Berryhill if the transition did not occur. Tr. Vol. I, p. 482, L. 4-25 top. 483, L. 1. However, 
that it what the Jury would have had to have concluded to support the Supreme Court's statement, 
"therefore the payments related to moving the restaurant downtown and constructing the tenant 
improvements in both the originally leased space and in the expansion were simply sums spent to market the 
Polo Cove development." 
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The record reflects that the parties had agreed to a "buy-in" figure of $400,000.00, and that Mosell 
Equities provided $405,000.00 in funds. Thereafter and although Mosell Equities substantially, if not fully, 
complied with the terms of the "buy-in," Berryhill refused to tender stock or any equity in Berryhill & Co., 
Inc., and then refused to return Mosell Equities' money. Berryhill therefore undeniably breached his contract 
with Mosell Equities. 
IV. AS THE VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, 
A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED, AND A DIFFERENT OUTCOME IS LIKELY 
To grant a new trial, the judge must also conclude that a different result would follow a retrial. Heitz 
v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 193 (1990). "This standard requires more than a mere 
possibility; there must be a probability that a different result would be obtained in a new trial." Sheridan v. 
St. Luke's Reg. Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 782, 25 P.3d 88, 9514 (2001). 
If the Court were to find the verdict is "not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of 
the evidence," then the rational conclusion is some force, other than the logical and reasoned 
interpretation of the evidence caused the particular result. Therefore, it is expressed in such a ruling "the 
verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence," a new trial is warranted 
and a different result is likely. 
Moreover, as the Court ruled in granting the JNOV there was an express contract. During the 
new trial, the jury will be instructed there was an express contract, so a different verdict is undeniable. 
V. JNOV ON ONE ELEMENT OF A CAUSE OF ACTION 
The Supreme Court was critical of the Court's decision granting JNOV on its finding there was a 
contract. However, by remanding the Supreme Court is acknowledging this issue may be addressed at 
summary judgment when a new trial is scheduled. Mosell Equities agrees Exhibit 1 is not ambiguous 
and is a valid contract, as are each check that Mosell Equities delivered to Berryhill that was marked 
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"loan," and which Berryhill accepted with the unambiguous term "loan" clearly annotated on each 
document. 
CONCLUSION 
In 27 years on the bench, this Court stated it was "shocked" only twice when it heard the verdict. 
The Court also stated this was one of the cases. This verdict was against the clear weight of the 
evidence, and as it "shocked" the Court, Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial. Again, if the Supreme 
Court, having reviewed the entire trial transcript and evidence, believed there was no basis upon which 
this Court could have granted a Motion for New Trial, it is unlikely the Supreme Court would have 
remanded this case for further review and decision by this Court. The reality, justice is served by 
granting Mosell Equities a new trial, and allowing it to move for summary judgment on the issues 
addressed by the JNOV decision. In the alternative, a terrible injustice would result if Mr. Berryhill is 
allowed to "take only one side of the sword." 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of May, 2013. 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of May, 2012, I served the foregoing, by having two 
true and complete copies delivered via the manner indicated to: 
Judge Dennis Goff 
Copies delivered to Chambers for delivery to Judge Goff 
Daniel E. Williams 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St. Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Via facsimile 
ERIC R. CLARK 
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DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
• NO.-----=Fl::-;:L~:=--t-. """=i3"7"".-:::~.,,.,..--A.M, ___ _ 
JUN O 4 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ANNAMARIE MEYER 
DEPl.."rY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND 
REMAND 
Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., by and through its counsel ofrecord, pursuant to 
the stipulation of counsel, hereby submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion 
for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a unanimous jury found for Defendant on Plaintiffs breach of contract claim and 
after the Idaho Supreme Court unanimously found that, based on the evidence, reasonable minds 
could have reached the very same conclusion as the jury, Plaintiff now asserts that these findings 
are against the "clear weight" of the evidence and it is entitled to a new trial. Despite these same 
findings, Plaintiff must also convince this Court there is a "probability," not just a possibility, 
that a different result would be obtained in a new trial. Upon a thorough review of the 
conflicting evidence in this case, this Court cannot make the requisite findings to justify a new 
trial as to the breach of contract claim. 
OVERVIEW 
As this Court will recall, this is a case of a failed business relationship between a former 
Eagle developer and a Boise restauranteur. The sole owner and managing member of Plaintiff 
Mosell Equities, LLC, ("Mosell Equities" or "Plaintiff'), Glenn E. Mosell ("Mosell"), was the 
developer of a proposed development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be known as 
"Polo Cove" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21 ). In the summer of 2005, Mosell approached John 
Berryhill ("Mr. Berryhill"), sole shareholder and president of Berryhill & Company, Inc., about 
opening a restaurant within the development. Mosell Equities then began paying Mr. Berryhill as 
a consultant on the Polo Cove development. Ultimately, however, Mosell discussed a different 
relationship between them, which would allow Mr. Berryhill to participate in Polo Cove profits 
beyond daily restaurant operations. The parties agreed to "blend" certain of their activities and 
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form a new entity called MoBerry Ventures or similar names. Berryhill & Company would 
contribute its name, restaurant operations and expertise and Mosell Equities would contribute 
cash to buy into the new combined entity. 
Corporate documents for a MoBerry entity went through some drafts with attorneys, but 
were never finalized or executed. Nevertheless, on approximately June 28, 2007, Mosell 
Equities made its first cash contribution. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check, which is 
signed by John Berryhill and Glenn Mosell (referred to as Exhibit 1 ), there appears the following: 
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses 
during our bookeeper [sic] transition. It will go into the general check register & 
be used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co. I1 
will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" ofMoberry Venture Corp. Inc. 
( emphasis added) 
Subsequently, Mosell Equities made further contributions by check, some of which 
referenced the term "loan" and some of which did not. When Mr. Berryhill asked Mosell about 
the reference to a "loan," Mosell responded: "we have to call it something." Mosell later 
acknowledged that the "loan" was only an "interim substitute." The bulk of Mosell Equities' 
cash contribution went to tenant improvements at a new downtown Boise restaurant location, 
plus a later, large expansion at the same location, including a "Polo Cove" showroom. 
Mosell ultimately abandoned the Polo Cove development. Mosell Equities then brought 
this action based on several legal theories premised on the fact that there was a simple loan 
transaction between the parties, nothing more. The jury found for Defendant Berryhill & 
Company on all these theories, including breach of contract, breach of an implied-in-fact contract 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND, P. 3 
000042
and unjust enrichment. 1 Later, this Court granted Plaintiffs motion for JNOV on one element of 
the express contract claim, believing it should have instructed the jury that Exhibit 1 constituted a 
contract, but it would be up to a second jury to determine what the parties intended by it. This 
Court denied Plaintiffs motion for JNOV and new trial on the remaining counts. Thereafter, the 
Idaho Supreme Court reversed the order granting Plaintiffs motion for JNOV on Count I and 
remanded. 
Below, Defendant reviews the trial record at some length to demonstrate that the clear 
weight of the evidence was not contrary to the jury's verdict regarding Count I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The sole owner and managing member of Plaintiff Mosell Equities, Glenn E. Mosell, was 
the developer of a proposed development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be 
known as "Polo Cove." Mosell testified: 
There was a vineyard for sale around 2004 and 2005 that was listed, it was on the 
market, and a realtor show- took me out there, showed it to me. And it's in the 
Sunnyslope area of Canyon County. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 159, L. 9) 
So - I assembled a few pieces. And they referred to 290 acres or 300 acres was the 
original block. And I was looking to probably sub-divide it into five-acre little 
gentleman farms, little vineyards, and sub-divide and sell five-acre parcels. After 
The jury found for Plaintiff on a count for conversion regarding a very small 
amount of furniture and awarded $2,016.85. The jury also found for Defendant John E. Berryhill 
individually on a fraud-in-the-inducement claim. 
2 Defendant further refers the Court to Section I of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
Decision of February 22, 2013, entitled "Factual Background," which is hereby incorporated by 
reference. Mosel/ Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co.,_ Idaho_, 297 P.3d 232,240 (Idaho 
2013). 
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a little while ... we decided to maybe propose a winery, or a wine country 
restaurant at that site. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21) 
Masell had experience in the development field. He grew up in Southern California and 
graduated from UC San Diego in the early 1980s (Tr., Vol. I, p. 158, L. 9). He was an economics 
major and ultimately obtained his Series 6 license, working as an investment broker (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 328, L. 1 ). Masell moved to Boulder, Colorado, and started a development called Mill 
Village. Eventually, Masell and his partner had a "difference of opinion in vision" and Masell 
was bought out prior to any construction having begun (Tr., Vol. I, p. 328, L. 24). 
Masell subsequently pursued a development in San Marcos that he ultimately walked 
away from and nothing was built (Tr., Vol. I, p. 332, L. 2). In Fredericksburg, Texas, Masell put 
some land under contract intending to develop it and then decided not to go forward (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 332, L. 13). After moving to Idaho in 2000, Masell became involved in a development known 
as Iron Horse in Cascade where disagreements arose and that development ended, nothing having 
been built (Tr., Vol. I, p. 334, L. 6). 
In July of 2005, Masell approached the owner and President of Defendant Berryhill & 
Company, John Berryhill, initially about building a restaurant within the Polo Cove development 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21). Regarding the evolution of his relationship with Mr. Berryhill relative 
to his restaurant and Polo Cove, Masell testified: 
I just called and left a message, introduced myself as a developer, asking if he was 
interested in building a wine country restaurant, and just left a message. (Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 160, L. 25) 
I recognized that he [Mr. Berryhill] was a local chef with a following. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 161, L. 20). For Boise, he's fairly well-known. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 161, L. 24) 
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He [Mr. Berryhill] expressed interest in being a part of the vin - vineyard venture. 
And so, I paid him, as a consult, to help design a restaurant, and how it would lay 
out on the hill, and I ultimately paid him $25,000 in consulting fees. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 166, L. 5) 
[Mr. Berryhill could] offer insight, as a restaurateur, on how a restaurant might be 
designed, or how many tables in a certain area, or kitchen layout. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
175, L. 9) 
In addition to utilizing Mr. Berryhill's knowledge and expertise in designing restaurants, 
Masell intended to build a Berryhill & Company restaurant ("Berryhill Restaurant") within the 
Polo Cove development and intended that Mr. Berryhill would participate in the ultimate success 
of the project. 
I'm a partner in Polo Cove. So, ifl was a partner in a restaurant venture, then I 
can bring opportunities to that restaurant or add whatever skill set I might have, 
you know and that - that comes with a real estate background. And so, we looked 
at the opportunities even in downtown Boise; all right? But if I was a part of a 
restaurant, half owner of a restaurant, then maybe I would pursue opportunities 
where a restaurant would be an amenity to the project. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 171, L. 3) 
*** 
I paid John Berryhill $25,000 for consulting work, to work toward design of a 
restaurant at Polo Cove. When we agreed on the buy-in - or the sale of half of his 
company to me, at that point the consulting fee wasn't appropriate. He would be 
working toward a common goal of opportunity at Polo Cove, and so [sic]. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 241, L. 14; emphasis added) 
Masell also acknowledged that the Berryhill name and reputation increased the value of 
the development. 
Q: Let me ask you about another one. Merely by him, meaning Berryhill, 
branding the restaurant, overseeing those operations, with really no need 
for him to invest his own monies in that real estate, he would enhance the 
value of the surrounding vineyard and uses. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
FOLLOWING APPEAL AND REMAND, P. 6 
000045
• 
A: Correct. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 360, L. 6) 
Q: And so, you paid the $400,000, and it was in part to recognize the value of 
the Berryhill name? 
A: Correct. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 362, Ll.14-16) 
Q: And is it fair to say that the PKF Consulting Group, in their feasibility 
study, indicated that Mr. Berryhill's strong and loyal following added or 
increased the feasibility of the overall development? 
A. Correct. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, LL 11-16; Defendant's Exhibit JJJ, p. 6). 
Mosell ordered Polo Cove business cards for Mr. Berryhill with the title of "Partner" (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 603, L. 6-16; Defendant's Exhibit N). Mr. Berryhill did not recall any other Polo Cove 
cards referring to partner (Tr., Vol. I, p. 605, L. 6). 
Mosell initially contemplated a small, wine-country development of 290 acres. Robert 
Taunton, a consultant for Polo Cove, testified as follows: 
At the time that I started working on the project [2007], the first phase of 
the Polo Cove overall project, which is roughly about 300 acres, was in 
public hearings in front of the Planning Commission out in Canyon 
County for a conditional use permit. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 196, L. 6-10) 
And then, after that we started working on a larger scale planning project 
for the total property which was 1,600 acres. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 196, L. 16) 
I thought that the initial development approval on the 300 acres, which 
was a winery, hotel, restaurant, education facility, and some residential in 
the - I the vines, really had a lot of merit and had potential in the 
marketplace. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 202, L. 11-15) 
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The project more than quintupled, expanding from 290 acres to 1,600 acres. The Polo 
Cove Executive Overview was circulated to potential investors (Tr., Vol. I, p. 201, LL 9-18). 
The Executive Overview drafted on behalf of Plaintiff dated June 18, 2008 states that, in addition 
to the 290 original acres, it "secured and funded land options for approximately 1,100 acres 
adjacent to the resort and winery parcel" (Defendant's Exhibit DDD, page 13). The Illustrative 
Map drafted by Plaintiffs architect (Ibid, page 16) shows that a charter school, education center, 
artisan center, interpretive center, winemakers lodge, fire stations, health and wellness center, 
sporting center, parks, storage barns, water reclamation facility, polo and event fields, an 
equestrian center and an amphitheater, were just some of the intended attractions. 
Mr. Berryhill testified regarding Plaintiffs Exhibit 25, reading from a portion as 
follows: 
For - for the new downtown location of his restaurant, John Berryhill has recently 
partnered with developer Glenn Mosell. The two are also developing Polo Cove, 
a 1,600-acre living and resort community in the Snake River Valley Appalachian. 
A Berryhill' s restaurant will anchor a boutique hotel, vineyard homes, a winery, 
spa, sporting club, and an equestrian center with polo fields. Catering and special 
events will be a primary focus, with vineyard weddings and receptions, festivals, 
concerts, and corporate events. Polo Cove is 30 minutes from Boise and is 
surrounded by 360 degree views of the Owyhee Mountains and the Boise 
Foothills. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 575, L. 15-p. 576, L.l; Plaintiffs Exhibit 25). 
Steve Inch, owner of Propel Communications, with 25 years of marketing and brand 
development experience, was an independent contractor working with Mogul Development 
Group, in partnership with Mosell, and was hired to create a package to present to potential 
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investors of Polo Cove (Tr., Vol. I, p. 853, L. 6). When asked about his understanding of the role 
of the Berryhill Restaurant with regard to a gourmet restaurant at Polo Cove, Mr. Inch stated: 
My understanding was that there was some type of partnership arrangement 
between Polo Cove development and Berryhill, and that Berryhill was the 
restaurant that would be a key draw to potential guests to the development itself, 
on - in the early stages. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 855, L. 15) 
*** 
... [I]t was presented in a way, to me, that Berryhill is involved in this 
development, and that they were - the Berryhill name is an important part of the 
development itself. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 855, L. 25) 
Mr. Inch stated that the Berryhill name had a "pretty high equity" in terms of the local 
marketplace and explained that as follows: 
A: Well, we're - one of the things that is - is important to understand is, 
when you're creating a new development it's an- an issue of point of 
difference in the marketplace. What makes Polo Cove unique to another 
development that maybe have similar amenities? 
*** 
And my understanding is that - and I think rightly so - bringing on a name 
such as Berryhill, and that brand equity that exists in the marketplace, 
which means - there's brand equity and there's brand image, and they're 
very different. 
Q: When you - when you're talking about leveraging someone's brand 
equity, can you put that in layman's terms. 
A: Michael Jordan and Nike. If - whether or not Nike sells a shoe or not, 
they still pay for the value of the Michael Jordan name. This is similarly 
what I believe was done at Polo Cove. That without having anything other 
than the vineyards and the beautiful views, which are tremendous, 
Berryhill was something someone could touch, feel, taste, and realize as 
being in existence, thus adding credibility to the development. 
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And the reality is, there's a-years of investment in that name and there's 
value in that. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 856, L. 10) 
Mr. Berryhill devoted substantial amounts of time to the Polo Cove venture, working 
with the original architects, running the architect group, coordinating the efforts of the web 
designer and art direction. During that whole time, Mr. Berryhill was trying to put Mosell's 
vision to paper, getting it developed to build (Tr., Vol. I, p. 680, L. 3; Defendant's Exhibit 
FFFF). Mr. Berryhill did so upon his understanding with Mosell, as Mosell testified above, that 
Mr. Berryhill would participate in the Polo Cove profits beyond operation of the restaurant (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 359, L. 21 -p. 360, L. 5). 
At Mosell's urging, the Berryhill Restaurant moved to downtown Boise at the Plaza 121 
location. Mosell told Mr. Berryhill that they needed a sexy space, something better than a strip 
mall, where the Berryhill restaurant was previously located. And downtown has - is "sexy" (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 579, L. 23). They also needed a place to "wine and dine" investors and to show "the 
essence of what we were developing at Polo Cove" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 580, L. 4). Mr. Berryhill 
testified that Mosell wanted a sexy place downtown: "I can't bring my clients that are going to 
invest a million dollars to an ugly strip mall behind a Firestone Tire Store. I need a sexy place so 
we can sell this, so we can sell you, so we can sell the Berryhill name" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 716, LL 13-
19). 
Mr. Berryhill started the Berryhill Restaurant in March of 1998 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 427, L. 22). 
The restaurant was originally in the 8th Street Marketplace in downtown Boise, however it had to 
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be relocated due to the demolition and reconstruction of BODO. Mr. Berryhill moved the 
restaurant to a strip mall on Broadway Avenue in Boise (Tr., Vol. I, p. 582, L. 3). Mr. Berryhill 
wanted to eventually move downtown but testified as to why he agreed to move at that time as 
follows: 
I was fine in an ugly strip mall hidden behind a Firestone Tire store in what used 
to be a condom shop, doing wonderful. I had always loved downtown. I was 
downtown before, and I was in the Downtown Business Association before. Yes, 
I love downtown. I would love to go back to downtown. I did not go to 120 [sic] 
North Ninth Street because I wanted to be back downtown. I went there because 
your client [Mosell] and I, together, chose this sexy restaurant to spearhead Polo 
Cove. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 476, L. 14) 
I - I didn't have a - I liked downtown, I enjoyed downtown, I enjoyed being a part 
of the DBA when I was down there previously. The First Thursdays that go on, 
there's a lot of activity that went on being downtown. I didn't have that being out 
on Broadway. However, I wasn't seeking space. I had no timeline or- I don't 
think I ever voiced, even in my head, that I ever wanted to go back downtown. I 
didn't have a - I didn't have a view of - or vision, or projection of going back 
downtown. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 582, LI. 8-17) 
When asked if it was Mosell's idea to move the restaurant downtown, Mr. Berryhill 
responded: 
Absolutely ... He [Mosell] was meeting with investors that wanted to open a 
restaurant for a million dollars a key. He did not want to take them to a strip mall. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 477, LI. 2-9) 
Mr. Berryhill further testified regarding Mosell's attempts to identify potential 
downtown restaurant locations: 
He [Mosell] started finding properties that - that originally you would have to 
build out and, I assume, use a builder. Properties like where the Spaghetti Factory 
is, used to be Louie's. And we went and looked at it, and he was talking about he 
had already found out that you could build, on top of it, condos and actually even 
go taller than the phone - I believe it's the phone company building beside it, to 
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view - there was no variance, I believe was the term, that you couldn't build on 
top. That was - that was one .... He talked to commercial real estate brokers, 
another developer. We both met with Gary Christensen and Robert Kaylor of R. 
Grey, who started the R. Grey Lofts where the AppleOne building is, where 
AppleOne - or iPod, down at Eighth Street, to buy that space. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 580, 
L. 19-p.581, L. 15) 
Mr. Berryhill testified that Mosell took the lead in identifying a new downtown location 
because Mr. Berryhill was busy running his restaurant was not a real estate broker (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
581, LI. 18-23). 
Mosell and Mr. Berryhill had previously hired an attorney, Kimbell Gourley, in relation to 
a purchase and sale contract for the purchase of a strip mall on Broadway A venue in Boise (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 826, L. 16). They met with Mr. Gourley again on March 6, 2007 to discuss the 
proposed formation of a new corporation to be known as MoBerry Corporation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
827, L. 23). Mr. Gourley's understanding was that Mr. Berryhill and Mosell Equities were to 
become shareholders of this new corporation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 827, L. 23). Mr. Gourley 
subsequently sent drafts of the documents to the parties, leaving blanks because the parties had 
not resolved everything. When asked if it was his understanding that the transaction was going 
to take the form of a loan from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company, Mr. Gourley responded: 
The term - to my recollection, the term loan was never used. I never understood 
that there was going to be a loan that was made. And to be honest with you, it 
would be inconsistent with - with a capital contribution into a corporation. And 
so, I - nobody discussed that with me. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 829, L. 19) 
The lease for the new downtown restaurant space at Plaza 121 was signed on April 12, 
2007 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 681, L. 9; Plaintiffs Exhibit FFFF); both Mosell and Mr. Berryhill signed 
the Personal Guaranty for the lease (Tr., Vol. I, p. 885, L. 3; Plaintiffs Exhibit G). On June 28, 
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2007 (approximately two months after the lease was signed), Mosell wrote a check to Berryhill & 
Company, for $50,000. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check is the following notation: 
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses 
during our bookkeeper transition. It will go into the general check register & be 
used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co. 
It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" of Mo Berry Venture Corp. Inc. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 147, L. 13; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 [emphasis added]) 
The parties had never discussed loans and when Mr. Berryhill was asked what he 
understood the money to be, he testified, "Well, I never understood it to be a loan. We never 
discussed it as a loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 441, L. 19). Mr. Berryhill further testified: 
At the - at that time, I had - I saw nothing wrong with it because Glenn and I 
never discussed this money that he paid as a loan .... The word loan never came 
up until I saw that he wrote on the check. And I asked, we're doing this thing, this 
is not a loan, why are you writing a loan? And he said we have to classify it as 
something. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 443, LL 12-19) 
I believe my original testimony was that that word is a loan, and it was given to 
me by [Mosell], and - however, I did not have, at the time, an issue with it, 
because I turned and asked him, is - and I'm actually referring to the loan on the 
check, not the loan that I wrote below - and I asked him, well, this is not a loan. 
And he said, we have to call it something. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 523, L. 23) 
I understood Glenn to say that it was not a loan, but we had to call it something, 
so we could put it on the books and just park it so it would have - it wouldn't 
have to move until we signed the documents, and put in on a specific tax year. It 
could sit there. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 788, L. 16) 
From June 28, 2007 to April 30, 2008, Mosell wrote checks totaling $405,000 (Plaintiffs 
Exhibits 2-11.) When asked if he noticed that some, but not all, of the checks have the word loan 
written in the memo line, Berryhill testified that he did not see all of the checks until the lawsuit 
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due to the fact that the checks went to his general manager at the time (Tr., Vol. I, p. 590, L. 25-
p. 591, L. 9). 
When asked if he thought it was a loan, Mr. Berryhill testified: 
My understanding today, what the plaintiff is saying this loan means, is not what I 
understood when this was written, because that's not what he said. We never 
talked about that he could get it back. We never talked about it being a short-term 
loan. It was, as he stated, an inter- interim substitute. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 587, L. 4-9) 
Mr. Berryhill also testified that there was no doubt in his mind, at that time, that the 
transition would occur (Tr., Vol. I, p. 586, L. 22). 
Although Mosell had an economics degree and extensive real estate and financial 
experience, he never presented Mr. Berryhill with a note or any other documents relating to any 
purported "loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 593, L. 21). For his part, Mr. Berryhill testified that he has no 
legal or accounting training (Tr., Vol. I, p. 585, LL 9-13). 
The parties never signed the documents drafted by Mr. Gourley. In December, 2007, the 
parties met with Amy Dempsey, a CPA with the firm Riche, Dempsey & Associates, Chartered. 
The parties told Ms. Dempsey that they had some joint business proceedings dealing with a 
development called Polo Cove and that the expertise of both parties was required to put the 
project together. She understood that the name-brand of Berryhill & Company would be an 
anchor to the development and a draw for people who were going to be buying into Polo Cove as 
well as staying there (Tr., Vol. I, p. 792, L. 11 ). The parties further explained that the move from 
the strip mall to downtown would bump up the image of Berryhill & Company. The parties 
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would also have a front for Polo Cove where people walking downtown could obtain information 
on Polo Cove (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 793, L. 19). 
Ms. Dempsey testified that the parties had several meetings to try to put something 
together to understand the end goal of the parties, of what exactly was taking place (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
794, L. 1) . When asked if she, after several meetings, understood what the parties were trying to 
achieve, Ms. Dempsey replied, "I do not." She stated the reason was "Because I could never get 
a straight answer, from either Glenn or John, on what we would put together, if that is exactly 
what they were trying to achieve" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 794, L. 17). 
Ms. Dempsey further testified that she understood there were funds from Mosell being 
deposited into the Berryhill Restaurant account. When asked what understanding she gained 
from her meetings with Mosell regarding those funds, Ms. Dempsey replied: 
There was no clear definition of what the monies were for because there was a lot 
of activity that was going on from - where John was working out of the Broadway 
location to moving downtown. There was a lot of expenses being incurred to 
move forward this idea of Polo Cove. 
So, these monies going in - at one point in time, we just didn't have an 
explanation for it. And that is why we had meetings and trying to define it, as 
well as meetings with attorneys to get documents signed, because nothing was 
ever clearly defined by the two parties of what exactly those monies were for. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, LL 3-14). 
When asked if she recalled asking Mosell that question, she replied that Mosell told her, "Well, 
just when we get there, we' 11 get there (Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, L. 19). 
Ms. Dempsey further testified regarding any purported "loan:" 
Q. What did Mr. Mosell say to you, if anything, about the funds being a loan? 
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A. Well, he never was really clear if it was a loan, or if it was compensation 
for John's services for consulting fees, or if it was reimbursement of build 
out for the Polo Cove space. There was nothing ever clearly defined. It 
would just change from one day to the next so to speak. 
Q. Did you ask John the same question? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you get any clear answer? 
A. No. 
Q. Who did you expect to answer that question? 
A. Well, I expected that Glenn would have an answer for me because it was 
him putting the money in, and because the money was kind of coming in 
piecemeal as they were moving towards their goal. It's not like it was one 
lump sum transferred in at one point in time. 
Q. How was - how were those funds accounted for in the Berryhill & 
Company books? 
A. There were coded as what is termed a long-term liability. 
Q. And what did that signify. 
A. What that signified to me is that it was in a holding pattern until we had 
legal documentation to define how I was going to be able to treat those 
from an accounting standpoint. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 796, LI - p. 797, L. 2) 
Mosell never told Ms. Dempsey that the funds were considered a loan and never provided 
her with a copy of Exhibit 1 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 798, L. 1). Mosell testified that he considered the 
funds to be an "interim substitute" until his buy-in of MoBerry Venture Corp. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 321, 
L. 25- p. 323, L. 16). 
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James Tomlinson, is in the commercial real estate business in Boise and is the head of a 
group of investors that own and operate the building located at Plaza 121 where Berryhill's 
Restaurant moved in August 2007 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 881, LL 17-23). Mr. Tomlinson testified that 
when his company received a letter of intent from Berryhill, Inc. [sic] to rent the space at Plaza 
121, they questioned who the partners were and were told "the two of them" referring to 
Berryhill and Mosell (Tr., Vol. I, p. 884, L. 13-17). Mr. Tomlinson further testified: 
I didn't get a sense as to what - who owned the stock. Berryhill was a 
corporation, and - and I was told that these two folks owned it. And they both 
had agreed to sign a guarantee. And so, that was the limit to my investigation, I 
guess, of - Berryhill Company, so. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 894, LL 15-20) 
*** 
Obviously, I was told by them, because we then gave each of them a signature 
card authorizing us to investigate their background, and we asked each of them to 
sign a guarantee. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 895, LL 3-6) 
Mr. Tomlinson also testified that a few months after Berryhill & Company's restaurant 
moved into Plaza 121, he was approached by Mosell and Mr. Berryhill regarding leasing 
additional space at Plaza 121. His understanding was that it would be used for Polo Cove. He 
admitted he was "lukewarm" and talked to one or both of the parties several times before finally 
agreeing to the expansion. There would be a retail storefront that would give exposure to the 
Polo Cove concept (Tr., Vol. I, p. 886, L. 21 - p. 887, L. 2). 
Mr. Tomlinson further testified that during one of his tours of the expansion space, 
Mosell was "waving his hands and talking about where computers would be located, and how 
they would be packed up and moved into a backroom in the evenings, so that the - the retail 
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space could be converted to more of a lounge and - and a multi-use space." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 887, 
LI. 20-24). 
When Mr. Berryhill was asked whose idea it was to lease the expansion space, he testified 
that it was Mosell's. Mr. Berryhill further testified that he tried to put together various scenarios 
because he was concerned about the cost. However, Mosell advised Mr. Berryhill that he would 
fund the new banquet and ballroom and Polo Cove would fund the show room. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
626, L. 12- p. 628, L. 25). Mr. Berryhill testified that Mosell wanted a showroom to showcase 
Polo Cove; to have a "sexy office" with visual aids, posters and pictures of the development. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 622, LI. 17-24 ). 
Mosell Equities paid rent for the Expansion Area/Polo Cove Showroom for a total of 
eight months, the last check dated July 17, 2008. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 674, L. 10 - p. 675, L6; 
Defendant's Exhibit 00.) Mosell made no further payment. At the time of trial, the amount 
owing for the expansion space was $149,255.01 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 632, L. 9). 
When asked about Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, the $20,000 check with "Suite 101 Tis" on the 
memo line, and what relationship that check had with the buy-in of Mosell Equities, Mr. 
Berryhill testified: 
Our agreement on the Tis for the expansion space would be that Berryhill would 
pay for part of it, the ballrooms, and Polo Cove would pay for the Polo Cove 
space. And this 20,000 was the Tis for the Polo Cave - Polo Cove Suite 101 
space .... He said that - and we both agreed - that this - the Tis for Polo Cove 
did not go into the buy-in. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, L. 4-17) 
When asked if Mosell ever provided the full amount agreed to complete the buy-in of 
Mosell Equities, Mr. Berryhill replied, "He did not" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, LI. 18-21). 
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Mr. Berryhill testified that the cost to remodel the restaurant was $100,048.43 and the 
cost for the expansion space was $193,801.29, for a total of $293,849.72 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 688, L. 
23 - p. 690, L. 14; Defendant's Exhibit CCC-I). Mosell did not dispute that the final tenant 
improvements totaled approximately $300,000 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 327, L. 5-20). Mosell testified that 
the original estimate for Tis to the downtown location was only $50,000 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 346, L. 
18 - p. 34 7, L. 6; Plaintiff's Exhibit 19) ( emphasis added). 
James Tomlinson also testified that under the terms of the lease for Plaza 121, the only 
items that could be removed at the termination of the lease would be "tables and chairs, 
effectively moveable equipment." He also referenced paragraph 12 of the lease: "All alterations, 
additions and improvements, except fixtures which shall not become part of the building, shall 
remain in and be surrendered with the premises as a part thereof at the termination of this lease" 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 889, LI. 2-24; Defendant's Exhibit G). Thus, the bulk of the funds provided by 
Mosell Equities went to tenant improvements of the restaurant and "expansion space," which 
will remain with the building at the expiration of any lease. 
At the same time Mosell stopped paying rent on the Polo Cove showroom, he began to 
address the subject of the contributions made by Mosell Equities. At first he indicated that he 
"would like to look at owning fewer shares and getting some cash back" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 324, LI. 
10-12). 
In a subsequent email to Mr. Berryhill dated September 9, 2008, Mosell wrote: "John ... 
We need to get together to talk about my investment/divestment in Berryhill and 'lease' ... Let 
me know when you're available ... " (Tr., Vol. I, p. 414, LI. 10-15; Defendant's Exhibit MMM, p. 
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3). On October 6, 2008, Mosell again wrote, "John ... I think it's time to discuss our positions 
again .. When are you available this week ... I'd also like to go over my capital contributions with 
John ... Thanks ... Glenn" (Tr. Vol. I., p. 415, L. 25 - p. 416, L. 12; Plaintiffs Exhibit 38). 
In none of these communications did Mosell refer to the transactions as a "loan." 
Yet, on May 28, 2009, Mosell Equities filed this action against Defendants Berryhill & 
Company, John Berryhill and Amy Berryhill for theories of recovery all based on the false 
premise that the series of transactions constituted nothing more than a simple loan. 
In its Memorandum, Plaintiff largely relies on its own witnesses and draws inferences 
consistently in its own favor. Not satisfied at that, Plaintiff also recharacterizes the record 
starting early in its Brief. Regarding Exhibit 1, Plaintiff claims that "Mosell testified he asked 
Berryhill to write the note [Exhibit 1] as 'security' for my $50,000.00 check,"' and cites to (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 315, L. 3 - p. 318, L.11) (Plaintiffs Memorandum: 9). The actual testimony at that part 
of the transcript is: "Well, as security for my $50,000 check, I relied on John Berryhill's signature 
stating that it was a loan to be ultimately converted to equity in the new venture." 
Whether the parties intended Exhibit 1 to constitute an actual "loan" was obviously 
disputed, a fact Plaintiff will not face. John Berryhill testified: 
My understanding today, what the plaintiff is saying this loan means, is not what I 
understood when this was written, because that's not what he said. We never 
talked about that he could get it back. We never talked about it being a short-term 
loan. It was, as he stated, an inter - interim substitute. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 587, LL 4-9). The attorney working for the parties on the anticipated "buy-in" for 
"MoBerry Venture Corp," Kimbell Gourley, testified: 
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Q. In that regard, was it ever your understanding, and in conversations with Mr. 
Mosell or Mr. Berryhill, that the transaction was going to take the form of a loan 
from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company? 
A. The term - to my recollection, the term loan was never used. I never understood 
that there was going to be a loan that was made. And to be honest with you, it 
would be inconsistent with -- with a capital contribution into a corporation. And 
so, I - nobody discussed that with me. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 829, LI. 14-24). 
When testifying about his efforts to develop and market the Polo Cove development, 
Glenn Mosell testified: 
Q. Isn't it true that, nevertheless, the value of what you're trying to sell or to develop 
[Polo Cove] was greater because of the Berryhill name? 
A. And that's exactly why I paid $400,000 for half of the business, to use that name 
and to brand the wine country restaurant out there; true. 
Q. And so, you paid the $400,000, and it was in part to recognize the value of the 
Berryhill name? 
A. Correct. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 362, LI. 8-16) 
Elsewhere, upon further questioning regarding his desire to have the Berryhill brand as 
part of the Polo Cove development, Mosell testified: 
Q. If you recall, am I correct, Mr. Mosell, that this is the table - the first page, the 
table of contents, of your attorney Todd Lakey's submittal to the Canyon County 
Planning and Zoning Commission regarding the Polo Cove development? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And again, similar language on page six, if we can flip to it, under 3.2.2, 
restaurant, there's similar language about one of the southwest Idaho's most sought 
after chefs, do you see that? 
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A. Correct. 
Q. And it's referred to your attorney, to planning and zoning in Canyon County, that 
he plans to build a centerpiece restaurant at the summit of the vineyards; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then, it goes on to talk about John being one of the - also one of the most 
successful and prolific caterers in the state -
A. Yes. 
Q. -- correct? And you agreed with the language in that submission to Canyon 
County, didn't you? 
A. Absolutely. That's why I paid $25,000 for John's consulting work and then 
$400,000 for that branding. 
{Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, L. 23 - p. 367, L. 23). 
Thus, at trial, even Plaintiffs own principal, Glenn Mosell, did not consistently refer to 
the check funds as a loan and acknowledged they reflected rather the "buy-in," as well as 
Plaintiffs desire to purchase the Berryhill brand. 
Based on this evidence, as well as that described above, the jury rightly concluded that the 
parties did not intend a loan. Accordingly, there was no breach of a loan contract, because of 
Berryhill & Company's refusal to pay back the funds as if they were a loan. 
ARGUMENT 
The only issue remaining in this action is whether Plaintiff can make the requisite 
showing regarding its motion for new trial as to Count I for breach of contract. The only basis 
for new trial preserved is that under Rule 59(a)(6), I.R.C.P., based on the insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict. 
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1. The reguisite standard under Rule 59(a)(6) reguires more than disagreement 
with the verdict. 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court, in deciding a new trial motion "[t]he judge does 
not have unlimited authority to disturb the verdict of a jury. Respect for the function of the jury 
prevents the granting of a new trial except in unusual circumstances." Warren v. Sharp, 139 
Idaho 599, 603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003), quoting, Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 
392, 394 (1992). Under the similar federal rule, "[ w ]hat courts cannot do ... and what the district 
court here never purported to do ... is to grant a new trial 'simply because [the court] would have 
come to a different conclusion than the jury did."' Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F.3d 573,577 (5th 
Cir. Tex. 1998), quoting, 25 Fed. Proc., L. Ed.§ 58.13 (1984); see also, Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 
310, 314 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that jury's verdict should be accorded greater deference under 
Rule 59 in cases involving simple issues with highly disputed facts, than in cases involving 
complex issues with facts that are not as disputed). 
Under Rule 59(a)(6), I.R.C.P., the trial court must "determine (1) whether the verdict is 
against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would 
produce a different result." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741,751,274 P.3d 1256, 1266 
(2012) (emphasis added), quoting, Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 142 Idaho 
826,833, 136 P.3d 297,304 (2006); see also, Hudelson v. Delta Int'/ Mach Corp., 142 Idaho 
244,248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 378, 788 P.2d 188, 193 
(1990). Any motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence must "set forth the 
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factual grounds therefor with particularity." Rule 59(a)(7), I.R.C.P; Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 
Idaho 423, 430, 196 P.3d 341, 348 (2008). 
In Johannsen, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a district court's denial of a motion for 
new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) in a case involving alleged breach of contract and dissolution 
of an limited liability company. In so doing, the Court quoted with approval the district court's 
analysis: 
Here the district court judge stated, 'I exercise my discretion and can only grant 
this motion if I'm convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of 
the evidence ... ' He continued, ' .. .it was a good trial, a good issue, and the jury 
decided it one way. They could have gone the other way, but they went the way 
they did and found no breach of contract.' 
146 Idaho at 430. See, also, O'Shea v. High Mark Dev., LLC, 280 P.3d 146, 157-158 (2012) 
( approving denial of motion for new trial where district court found that, while it may not 
necessarily agree with the jury verdict, it did not find that it was against the clear weight of the 
evidence). Accordingly, the "clear weight" standard requires more than disagreement with the 
verdict. 
As the Supreme Court noted in the appeal of this case, "[t]o grant a new trial, the judge 
must also conclude that a different result would follow a retrial." 297 P.3d at 242, citing, Heitz v. 
Carroll, supra, 117 Idaho at 378. It also quoted language from Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg. Med 
Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 782, 25 P.3d 88, 95 (2001): "This standard requires more than a mere 
possibility; there must be a probability that a different result would be obtained in a new trial." 
Id. Based on a fair evaluation of the conflicting evidence and testimony in this case, this Court is 
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not able to conclude that the jury's verdict is contrary to the "clear weight of the evidence," nor 
that it is probable that a new trial would produce a different outcome. 
2. The "clear weight" of the evidence was not counter to the jury's verdict. 
As it has done throughout the proceedings, rather than engage contrary evidence, Plaintiff 
simply ignores it in its current motion. Plaintiff continues to argue that the use of the word 
"loan" on Exhibit 1 and certain checks negates any possible outcome other than that all of the 
funds at issue were meant to be and would remain a loan regardless of any other evidence or 
eventualities. In denying Mosell Equities' motion for directed verdict on Count I, this Court 
clearly understood that the "loan" language depended on the parties' intent: 
But I can see how there may have been a different intent at the time. So, the issue 
as to whether there was a meeting of the minds is something that can be 
legitimately pursued and presented to the jury, and the jury will make a decision. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 556, LI. 7-13). Even when granting Plaintiffs motion for JNOV, this Court did 
not pretend that the "loan" language could only have one meaning. At the hearing, this Court 
stated: "All I'm doing - I said, I'm setting aside the verdict because, as a matter of law, Exhibit 1 
is a contract, a binding contract. What we don't know is what does it mean?" (JNOV Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 109, LI. 7-10). 
For their part, the parties both treated Exhibit 1 as ambiguous requiring evidence of the 
parties' intent at the time. Mosell Equities itself noted this in its requested Jury Instruction based 
on IDJI 1.41.2 (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, LI. 10-14 ). Mo sell Equities further requested a special verdict 
that placed the interpretation of the ambiguous contract squarely in front of the jury. In its 
"Proposed Verdict Form" Plaintiff sought the following question for the jury at # 1: " ... did the 
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parties intend the money Mosell Equities provided, $50,000.00, to be a loan?" At #2, it 
requested the following question of the jury: "did the parties intend the money Mosell Equities 
provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to remain a loan pending Mosell Equities' "buy-in" of an entity 
formed by the parties?" (R., Vol. I, p. 1027, LL 1-4).3 
In the recent case of Idaho Dev., LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, 2011 Ida. LEXIS 
183 (Idaho Dec. 12, 2011 ), the Idaho Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the standards 
to be used when, in the similar context of debt recharacterization, an infusion of funds is to be 
considered either a loan or equity. This Court emphasized the proper inquiry is "the true intent of 
the parties in entering the transaction." And, "[b ]ecause the question of intent is one of fact, the 
determination as to whether to recharacterize an advance as a capital contribution or as a loan is 
an issue of fact." 2011 Ida. LEXIS 183, *16. The parties intent "may be inferred from what the 
parties say in their contracts, from what they do through their actions, and from the economic 
reality of the surrounding circumstances. Answers lie in facts that confer context case-by-case." 
2011 Ida. LEXIS 183, *13, quoting, In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448,456 (3rd Cir. 
2006). 
Here, there was credible evidence to believe that the term "loan" came from Mosell, who 
explained "we have to call it something" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 523, L. 23). This conclusion is not based 
3 Because Plaintiff continues to argue that Exhibit 1 is not really ambiguous at all, 
but susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, it is contradicting its own proffered jury 
instructions. This Court should ignore any such argument, including on the basis of the "invited 
error" doctrine. 
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on the credibility of John Berryhill alone,4 but on a great deal of confirming evidence.5 Based on 
the very language of Exhibit 1, a "loan" that "will be transitioned" is not a simple loan at all. 
Further, the parties were acting as partners in the activities of the restaurant move downtown, 
they were jointly signing guarantees of leases and procuring expansion space for both Polo Cove 
and the restaurant (Tr., Vol I, p. 885, L. 102; p. 626, L. 12- p. 628, L. 25). The funds at issue 
were placed on the books of Berryhill & Company in a "holding pattern," as accountant Amy 
Dempsey testified, while the parties attempted to finalize their actual agreement as to the "buy-
in" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 796, L.1 - P. 797, L. 2). She did not consider the funds to be either a loan or 
equity, because the parties, including Mosell, would never clarify the nature of the funds to her 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, LI. 3-20). 
The Supreme Court noted that, as they were instructed, the jury could reasonably have 
found from the evidence that the term "loan" had a "special meaning," according to the parties' 
intent. John Berryhill testified that he "understood Glenn to say that it was not a loan, but we had 
to call it something, so we could put it on the books and just park it so it would have - it 
wouldn't have to move until we signed the documents, and put in on a specific tax year. It could 
4 Plaintiff claims that John Berryhill was "not credible," based on this Court's 
admonition to him to answer questions more directly. Defendant submits that it is Glenn Mosell 
who suffered from more significant credibility problems, claiming that the parties always 
intended a loan, despite his own references to "investment" and "divestment." Moreover, Mr. 
Mosell' s credibility issues would only compound at any retrial, due to his recent felony 
conviction for tax evasion. See, USA v. Mosel!, Case No. 1 :l 1-cr-00001-BLW-l. 
5 Plaintiff ignores the testimony of Kim Gourley and Amy Dempsey, who never 
understood the funds to constitute a loan. This corroborates John Berryhill's testimony on the 
intent of both parties. 
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sit there" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 788, L. 16). As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]hat special meaning was 
that it was just a label for tax purposes." 297 P.3d. at 239. 
Even Mosell stated that the categorization of the funds as a "loan" was simply an "interim 
substitute." Rather than initially making demand on Berryhill & Company for repayment of any 
"loan" amount, Mosell testified that he approached Mr. Berryhill in the summer of 2008 and 
suggested a deal where Mosell would own fewer shares and get some cash back (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
324, LL 10-12). He also referred to his "investment/divestment in Berryhill and the lease" (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 414, LI. 10-13) and "my capital contributions" (Tr. Vol. I., p. 416, LL 4-6). The 
obvious inference from all of this evidence is that the parties were structuring a "buy-in," not 
contemplating a lender-borrower relationship. 
Accordingly, the jury's finding of no breach of contract was not contrary to the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
3. This Court cannot conclude that there is a probability that a new trial would 
produce a different outcome. 
In a telling error, Plaintiff claims that during oral argument in front of the Idaho Supreme 
Court, Plaintiff's counsel 
asked Justice Eismann what reasonable person would simply give someone 
$405,000.00 to build a restaurant and expect compensation only if a speculative 
venture that had not even broke [sic] ground came to fruition in the distant future? 
Judge Eismann did not respond. Obviously, there was no reasonable response, 
other than a concession that no sensible person would have done such a thing. 
(Plaintiff's Memorandum: 16). The actual exchange was quite different: 6 
6 See, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Chris Pierce, filed concurrently. 
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Mr. Clark: 
Justice Eismann: 
Mr. Clark: 
Justice Eismann: 
Mr. Clark: 
Justice Eismann: 
• 
Well, the fact that I have a problem with is Mr. Berryhill 
gets $405,000.00 of Mosell's money, and Masell does not 
get anything. Who in the world would enter into that type 
of agreement? 
Some people are speculators, and they are trying to develop some 
property, and then when the economy goes down, stop putting in 
the money. But, by the same token, why would Mr. Berryhill 
move downtown and incur increased expenses that he has to pay 
and that type of thing? 
Well, because he wanted to go back downtown and be flashy 
character from day one ... 
That's your client's version, and his version is a little different. 
Well, your Honor, the bottom line is I believe the overwhelming 
evidence, the clear weight of the evidence established, that nobody 
would just give another party just $405,000.00, and then all the 
checks are marked loan. 
You could also say nobody would make unsecured loans of 
$405,000.00 to somebody that does not have the ability to repay 
him. 
Clearly, the above exchange is quite different that the fictitious one portrayed in 
Plaintiffs Memorandum. It is also different in a significant way, because Justice Eismann 
identifies one of the key reasons why the jury verdict is not against the clear weight of the 
evidence and a new trial would produce no different result. The unavoidable fact is that Plaintiff 
was a developer involved in a very speculative development. He was an economics major and 
ultimately obtained his Series 6 license, working as an investment broker (Tr., Vol. I, p. 328, L. 
1 ). Despite his extensive real estate and financial experience, he never presented Mr. Berryhill 
with a note or any other documents relating to any purported "loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 593, L. 21). 
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For his part, Mr. Berryhill testified that he had no legal or accounting training (Tr., Vol. I, p. 585, 
L. 9-13 ). As C.P .A. Amy Dempsey testified, she expected Mo sell to characterize the funds for 
her, since they constituted his funds, but he failed to do so. None of these key facts are going to 
change at a subsequent trial. 
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to argue that at a new trial the jury "will be instructed there was 
an express contract, so a different verdict is undeniable" (Plaintiffs Memorandum: 19). Again, 
Plaintiff assumes that the jury found "no contract," rather than "no breach," an assumption that 
the Idaho Supreme Court found unwarranted based on the wording of the special verdict. Even if 
Judge Williamson had granted summary judgment that Exhibit 1 represented an express contract, 
as the Idaho Supreme Court found she did not, "because Masell Equities did not object to the 
jury instructions, it could not even be granted a new trial based upon an alleged error in them." 
297 P.3d at 240, citing, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assoc., LLP, 148 Idaho 
479,491,224 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). Accordingly, this Court is divested of the authority to 
order a new trial based on its view that Exhibit 1 constituted an express contract, based on 
Plaintiffs failure to preserve the issue.7 
Plaintiff ends its discussion with a claim that a "terrible injustice" would occur if the jury 
verdict stands. What Plaintiff ignores is that the great majority of the funds at issue went into 
tenant improvements not originally anticipated by the parties, not in Defendant's bank account. 
7 Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court would not have remanded had it not 
thought there was a basis upon which this Court could grant a new trial motion. This is 
erroneous. The findings to support a new trial were simply not in the record before them, since 
this Court considered that its decision on JNOV rendered Plaintiffs motion for new trial moot. 
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The jury considered all of these arguments and the evidence and obviously found that, because 
no loan was intended by the parties, Berryhill & Company was not liable for repayment of the 
funds as a loan. As the record summarized above demonstrates, this conclusion was not contrary 
to the ''clear weight" of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court was concerned that it should have instructed the jury that Exhibit 1 was a 
contract. As the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear, that concern was misplaced. All of the 
other issues that the Court anticipated would be decided by a jury in a subsequent trial -
principally "what does it mean?" - have already been decided and are not contrary to the clear 
weight of the evidence, even if that evidence was conflicting. This Court simply cannot make the 
detailed, particularized findings necessary to find otherwise, and cannot find that a second trial 
would as a probability result in a different outcome. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully 
requests that 
u~ 
DATED this _J_ day of June, 2013. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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I. I am a legal assistant with the law firm of Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP. 
2. On May 31, 2013, I obtained a copy of a CD from Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's 
Office that contains oral argument heard on January I 4, 2013, in the case of Mosell Equities, LLC 
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oral argument. 
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Eric Clark, Esq.: 
Daniel E. Williams, Esq.: 
• 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Oral Argument January 14, 2013 
Mosel/ Equities v. Berryhill & Co. 
Supreme Court #38338-2010 
Appearing on behalf of Mosell Equities 
Appearing on behalf of Berryhill & Co. 
EXCERPT FROM ORAL ARGUMENT: 
Mr. Clark: Well I think this is memorialized in Mr. Gourley's documents and 
Ms. Meyers' documents as they were being drafted as they guys proceeded through 2007 and 
2008. They were trying to put something together. And for example, when I asked Mr. 
Berryhill what was missing out of the Gourley documents, he said well I really don't know. 
Justice Eismann: He said he is not an attorney. He doesn't know what needs 
to be in them. 
Mr. Clark: Well .... 
Justice Eismann: But then Mr. Mosell said yeah I referred to him as my partner, 
but I didn't mean "partner" "partner." I just meant friend or somebody I am working with. 
Mr. Clark: Well and lay people tend to use those legal ease words. We know 
they that they have a meaning well beyond what the normal people do, and so I hear people hear 
say "partner" all the time and it makes me cringe a little bit but they don't have a legal 
relationship in writing. They obviously want .... 
Justice Eismann: They don't have to have a legal relationship to have written 
partnership agreement. 
Mr. Clark: Well, but when parties are looking at or calling themselves partners 
but are seeking legal advice as to what to put into a partnership agreement or a business entity, 
doesn't that show that the intent is that they don't have a valid enforceable agreement at the time 
regardless of how they referred to each other? 
Justice Eismann: Well could be or could be that they orally formed a 
partnership and then later wanted to get it more set forth in writing as to what they were agreeing 
to as to the specifics. 
Mr. Clark: Well, go to Exhibit 1 then, under those circumstances, there would 
be no reason to refer to it as anything as a loan .... EXHIBIT 
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Justice Eismann: Unless you agreed with Mr. Berryhill's testimony that Mr. 
Mosell said we have to call it something, so let's just call it a loan for now. 
Mr. Clark: Well, and I asked Mr. Berryhill what was it if it wasn't a loan, and 
he could not tell me. So .... 
Justice Eismann: It could be an investment in this nebulous development. 
Mr. Clark: Well, he never testified to that. Although, that is what Mr. Williams 
represented in his letter in April 09. Well, it is not a loan. It is not a buy-in. You are not buying 
into anything. This was a speculation in a Polo Cove, which none of that $405,000.00 ever went 
into Polo Cove. It went right in ... 
Justice Eismann: Depends on what the agreement was. If the agreement was we 
are going to move the restaurant downtown as part as developing Polo Cove, so that we have a 
place to wine and dine possible investors, and make it look ... then moving the restaurant 
downtown would be part of the development. 
Mr. Clark: Well, I am not disagreeing with that. But I am saying, we got a 
relationship here where one party is saying this is a loan and I want you to tell me it's a loan and 
so write down its a loan, and then the __ receives 9 checks totaling almost $400,000.00, 
marked "loan." And what does Berryhill do with those? He doesn't give Mr. Mosell equity in 
the company. He puts in a debt account in his .... 
Justice Eismann: There was even a dispute as to what company was going to be 
equity in. I mean in this respect. Whether Mr. Mosell was just going to buy a 50% interest in 
existing Berryhill & Co. or whether Berryhill & Co. was going to be the entity through which the 
development occurred. 
Mr. Clark: Right. I agree and you are looking at Mr. Worley's documents 
which have a separate entity and Ms. Meyers' documents as Berryhill & Co.'s buying 50% of 
Berryhill & Co. There is ... 
Justice Eismann: But again, the question is whether this transaction is simply it 
going to buy half of Berryhill & Co. or is it going to be what Berryhill & Co. currently is, or are 
you going to buy of half of the corporation that is going to be used to develop the development 
on Sunny Slope? 
Mr. Clark: Well, we would know that but we don't have any signed documents, 
Justice Eismann, and that therein lies the problem. Now .... 
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Justice Eismann: So maybe the jury said there is no contract. Or that it may 
have said it wasn't breached. We don't know. 
Mr. Clark: Well, but then getting back to the facts and the plain meaning of the 
documents and what the parties did, um ... let me ... the Mountain View Landowners case ... "the 
conduct of the parties to a contract and their practical interpretation of it is an important fact 
when there is a dispute over its meaning." Well, what do we have Mr. Berryhill doing? He is 
accepting these checks as loans. He is using them to build out the restaurant, which is what the 
parties were trying to do. He's accounting for those funds as a debt to his company, and there is 
no signed buy-in. The buy-in never occurred. It will never occur. So what we have looking at 
the facts of this case .... 
Justice Eismann: You could also look at those facts and say, if this was really a 
loan, there would have been some sort of agreement on the terms and repayment. If it was really 
buying half of existing Berryhill & Co., then you wouldn't get the $400 and some thousand, 
which was apparently more than what half value of Berryhill & Co. would be without also 
getting a contract when you parted with the money. I mean there is different ways the jury could 
look at the facts in this case. 
Mr. Clark: Well, the fact that I have a problem with is Mr. Berryhill gets 
$405,000.00 of Mosell's money, and Mosell does not get anything. Who in the world would 
entered into that type of agreement? 
Justice Eismann: Some people are speculators, and they are trying to develop 
some property, and then when the economy goes down, stop putting in the money. But, by the 
same token, why would Mr. Berryhill move downtown and incur increased rental expenses that 
he has to pay and that type of thing? 
Mr. Clark: Well, because he wanted to go back downtown and be flashy 
character from day one ... 
Justice Eismann: That's your client's version, and his version is a little 
different. 
Mr. Clark: Well, your Honor, the bottom line is I believe the overwhelming 
evidence, the clear weight of the evidence established, that nobody would just give another party 
just $405,000.00, and then all the checks are marked loan. 
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Justice Eismann: You could also say nobody would make unsecured loans of 
$405,000.00 to somebody that does not have the ability to repay him. 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, and by and through counsel, hereby provides its reply brief 
in support of its Motion for New Trial Following Remand. 
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REPLY ARGUMENT 
Berryhill can argue until he is blue in the face that there is conflicting evidence in this 
case. That is a given. However, Mosell is entitled to a new trial as the verdict was against the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
Berryhill concludes his "Statement of Fact" section by stating, "Based on the evidence, as 
well as that described above, the jury rightfully concluded the parties did not intend a loan." 
Berryhill Memorandum, p. 22. 1 (Emphasis added) However, once again, as he neglected to do 
at trial, Berryhill fails to identify if the parties did not intend a loan pending finalization of the 
buy-in documents, then just what did the parties intend? Even Berryhill conceded he did not 
believe Mosell intended to just give Berryhill $405,000.00. If not a loan, then just what were 
those funds, Mr. Berryhill? 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 482 [by Mr. Clark-Berryhill Testifying] 
4 Q. Did you tell Mr. Berry - or Mr. Mosell that 
5 if there's no transition to the buy-in, that you got to 
6 keep the money that he had given you? 
7 A. No. 
Berryhill also misstates the verdict form, which asked the jury to decide whether there 
was an "express contract." Berryhill contended at trial that there was no loan, but Mosell 
Equities was "buying into my business." In other words, Berryhill concedes there was a contract 
for Mosell Equities to purchase stock in Berryhill & CO., but claims it was not a "simple loan 
contract," as Masell Equities argued. The jury was not asked to determine whether or not it 
believed Mosell Equities, it was asked whether an express contract existed. While Mosell 
Equities contends the clear weight of the evidence establishes the parties agreed the funds would 
1 By local rule, Berryhill was only entitled to file a 25 page brief. 
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remain a loan pending finalization of the buy-in terms, a finding there was no contract was 
against any of the evidence. 
A. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THERE WAS A LOAN 
CONTRACT 
At the JNOV motion hearing, conducted a few weeks after the trial and while the trial 
testimony was fresh in the Court's memory, and after reviewing the evidence, the Court stated 
that it had been "shocked" only twice by verdicts in its lengthy career on the bench. One case 
involved a claim for medical malpractice, which the Court alluded to in its opinion and the other 
was in this case. 
JNOV Tr. p. 87. 
14. Now, I don't remember if it was 9 to 12 or 
15. if it was 12, but all I know is I was totally shocked. 
16. And that's how I was totally shocked here, because what 
17. do I have? 
In its oral ruling the Court stated why it was shocked; because the clear weight of the 
evidence established the agreement involved a loan that may be transitioned into Glenn's buy-in, 
if and when the parties agreed to the terms. The Court reasoned the best evidence to support this 
conclusion was the parties own actions, especially Berryhill's. 
JNOV Tr. p. 18 
14. Regarding that ambiguity, the plaintiffs 
15. assert, number one, it's not ambiguous. A loan's, a 
16. loan's, a loan. I think it was a duck's, a duck's, a 
17. duck was his argument exactly. And secondly, even if you 
18. didn't think a loan, then you need to see -- because what 
19. people say, their actions are better -- are stronger than 
20. their words. 
21. And so, what were -- was Berryhill's actions, 
22. what was Mosell's actions? And they -- their actions all 
23. treated it as a loan, to be -- and Judge Williamson talks 
24. about this to be transitioned into the buy-in of 
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25. Berryhill and Company. 
JNOV Tr. p. 19 
1. When I read it -- and I think I even told 
2. Counsel this at the beginning of the trial, why are we 
3. here? I don't understand why we're here. It seems 
4. pretty clear to me. It's a contract. I'm giving you 
5. this money for a buy-in to Berryhill. 
Later in its opinion, the Court specified just what evidence it relied on when concluding 
the verdict was not justified. 
Jl\J"OV Tr. p. 91 
22. So, when I analyze this, and based really 
23. upon Counsels' arguments today, it seemed to me, in the 
24. trial and during the arguments today, that Berryhill 
25. wants to only take one side or one edge of the sword. If 
Jl'l"OV Tr. p. 92 
1. you call something a loan in your own handwriting, and 
2. you put in your own -- and instruct your own staff to 
3. insert it, whether by you're a taxpayer, or for tax 
4. purposes, or for whatever, as a loan, then how can you 
5. not take the other side of the -- the deal that it is a 
6. loan? And that has bothered me from day one. 
The Court is correct, the clear weight of the evidence established Berryhill understood the 
funds were a loan because he used that term in Exhibit 1 and then thereafter treated Mosell 
Equities' funds as a loan in his accounting records. Berryhill's own bookkeeper and manager, 
Joy Luedke, testimony Berryhill ignores in his memorandum, confirmed Berryhill's 
understanding the funds were a loan. Nothing in Berryhill's brief establishes the Court was 
incorrect in its conclusion. 
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B. THE MEIER DOCUMENTS ACCURATELY REFLECTED THE PARTIES AGREEMENT 
Berryhill also ignores the clear language of the Victoria Meier documents in his brief and 
instead refers the Court to the testimony of Kim Gourley. While, Mr. Gourley's documents 
reference an all "cash" buy in, the meeting with Gourley took place before Mosell Equities 
delivered any funds to Berryhill, so logically there would not be any "loan" language in those 
documents. When Gourley was involved the deal was cash for stock as evidenced in Exhibit 34. 
Consequently, Gourley's testimony should carry little weight. 
Moreover, contrast Exhibit 34 with the Meier documents (Exhibit 35) as set forth in 
Mosell Equities' initial brief. It is significant that Exhibit 35 was drafted after Mosell had 
already delivered $405,000.00 to Berryhill based on Berryhill's promise in Exhibit 1 he was 
acknowledging those funds as a loan pending consummation of the buy in, when and if that 
occurred. As the Court will recall at trial when Berryhill was asked repeatedly about what he 
would change in the Meier documents; he did not testify he believed the "loan" language clearly 
written in those documents was in any manner incorrect. Tr. Vol. I, p. 452, 1. 18 top. 456, L. 14. 
C. CPA DEMPSEY WAS NOT CREDIBLE 
Berryhill also cites to the testimony of Accountant Dempsey, who remains Berryhill's 
accountant, and who claims she did not know how to "classify" the funds from Mosell Equities. 
However, her testimony has little weight if any as it was directly contradicted in her own e-mail 
to Berryhill (Exhibit 37), where she states. "If you choose to continue to set it up in 2007 then 
Glenn would receive a K-1 from Berryhill, if you chose to set the buy-in in 2008 then we would 
just leave the monies Glenn donated in 2007 on the books as a loan and then reclass the loan 
amounts that are associated with the buy-in to his capital account in 2008." If Dempsey did not 
understand Mosell Equities' funds were a loan, then why would she repeatedly refer to those 
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funds as a "loan" in her March 5, 2008 e-mail to Berryhill? In light of the contents of this 
document, Dempsey's testimony was simply not credible. Moreover, there was no proof that 
Berryhill ever responded to this e-mail and asserted Dempsey's reference to Mosell Equities' 
funds as loans was inaccurate. 
D. MOSELL EQUITIES FUNDS WERE AN "INTERIM SUBSTITUTE" 
Berryhill once again argues Glenn's statement the funds he provided to Berryhill were an 
"interim substitute" somehow establish Glenn was admitting the funds were not a loan. 
However, the reality as Glenn testified at trial, the "loaned" funds were an "interim substitute" 
for cash for the buy in. If the parties agreed to the terms of the buy-in, then the loaned funds 
would substitute as cash for the buy-in, just as is stated in the Meier documents. 
E. POLO COVE IS IRRELEVANT 
After hearing the evidence at trial, the Court concluded; "Well Polo Cove is really 
nothing. It was a dream in the first place, and investment dream." JNOV Tr. p. 18, LL 7-9. 
However, Berryhill wastes the majority of his Statement of Facts section referencing testimony 
related to Polo Cove. 
The Court was accurate in its assessment of Berryhill's character; that Berryhill wants the 
benefit and ignores any responsibility or downside, ("Berryhill wants to only take one side or one 
edge of the sword") and Berryhill's claim he was an actual "partner" in the Polo Cove project 
exemplifies the Court's accurate assessment. Berryhill only wants to take one side of the sword; 
he claims he was a partner, but then has not paid a dime of any outstanding debt related to the 
failed Polo Cove project. Typical Berryhill! 
Moreover, at trial, Berryhill claimed he was impoverished because he was unable to use 
the "Expansion/Polo Cove showroom" space, which Berryhill claimed Mosell forced Berryhill to 
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lease. However, within a few short months following the trial, Berryhill opened two new 
ventures in this space; the "Plan B" lounge, and Berryhill's "Bacon" restaurant. 
(http://johnberryhillrestaurants.com) Additionally, Berryhill offered his lease for the downtown 
space as Defendants' Exhibit G at trial. The lease is for a 5-year term and was dated April 12, 
2007. According to the lease, it terminated on April 12, 2012. Nonetheless, Berryhill continues 
to operate his Berryhill & CO. restaurant, two new ventures, and his catering business, all from 
the downtown location. If Berryhill was losing money, as he testified at trial, then why would he 
stay in the downtown location and renew the lease? 
F. A NEW TRIAL WOULD PROVIDE A DIFFERENT RESULT 
The clear weight of the evidence established the parties intended the funds to be a loan 
pending the buy-in. At the new trial, if Berryhill survives a motion for summary judgment, the 
Jury will be instructed that a contract existed as a matter of law. The only remaining issue is 
whether Berryhill breached this express contract. Berryhill resolves that issue by judicial 
admission in his Appellant's Brief. 
The jury quite simply found that, in determining the parties' intent, there was no 
simple loan transaction intended, which was clearly within their providence to do. 
If they had found a loan was intended, they would doubtless have found a 
breach in answer to Question No. 1 on the Special Verdict. (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, 
LL 20-23) and damages in some amount in answer to Question No. 2. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 30. (Emphasis added) 
The reality, while Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial and a different outcome is 
probable, it is unlikely there will ever be a new trial. As there was an express contract as a 
matter oflaw, and Berryhill has admitted a breach, the case will be resolved in Mosell Equities' 
favor at summary judgment. 
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G. BERRYHILL ADMITTED THERE WAS AN EXPRESS CONTRACT 
Even for the sake of argument, and despite the overwhelming evidence the parties 
intended Mosell Equities' funds were a loan pending a buy-in, the jury concluded there was no 
"simple loan contract," that was not the question they were asked to decide. 
Question No. 1: Was there an express contract between Plaintiff Mosell 
Equities, LLC, and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. which was breached? 
Berryhill admitted there was a contract whereby Mosell Equities was purchasing part of 
Berryhill & CO. Berryhill testified that he understood that Mosell was paying money to 
Berryhill & Company, in consideration for a 50% ownership interest in Berryhill & Company. 
Trial Tr., p. 482 [by Mr. Clark- Berryhill testifying] 
24 Q. Okay. Let me ask you then, what those were 
25 funds, in your mind? 
p.483 
1 He was buying into my business. 
Berryhill also confirmed his understanding while testifying in the Broadway Park Case. 
The "buy-in" terms identified and confirmed in the Meier documents were consistent with 
Berryhill's testimony in the Broadway Park case that Mosell Equities had already paid in the 
required funds and all that was left was to sign the appropriate documents. Tr. Vol. I, p. 445, 
L. 4 top. 448, L. 13. 
It is undisputed that Mosell substantially performed and paid the requisite funds for the 
buy in. Even if against the clear weight of the evidence the jury concluded there was no loan, the 
only other evidence presented at trial was Berryhill's admission there was a contract for the 
purchase of stock in Berryhill & CO. Either there was a loan agreement that would act as 
consideration for the ultimate buy-in, which is supported by the clear weight of the evidence, or 
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there was a straight stock purchase contract as Berryhill claimed. Consequently, any verdict that 
there was no "express contract" ignores the evidence. There simply was no evidence to support 
the verdict there was no "express contract," even if the jury disregarded the clear weight of the 
evidence the parties intended a loan. 
It is also undisputed that Berryhill refused to tender the promised stock in Berryhill & 
CO. Whether the express contract was for a loan or for a straight buy-in, the clear weight of the 
evidence established Berryhill has breached either way. 
H. MOSELL EQUITIES IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION 
On remand, based on Berryhill's testimony at trial, Mosell Equities would be entitled to 
rescind the contract as although Mosell Equities has substantially performed and provided the 
funds necessary for the buy-in, Berryhill refused to tender the promised stock, despite his 
testimony at trial that the funds Mosell Equities had paid for the purpose of the buy-in. 
P. 482 [by Mr. Clark- Berryhill testifying] 
24 Q. Okay. Let me ask you then, what those were 
25 funds, in your mind? 
P.483 
1 He was buying into my business. 
While the Supreme Court suggests Mosell Equities could have just been paying expenses 
for Polo Cove, even Berryhill himself concedes that was not true. Mosell Equities was "buying" 
stock in Berryhill & CO., Inc., and Mosell had completed the buy-by paying the requisite funds, 
as Berryhill testified in the Broadway Park case. Moreover, Berryhill's financial records 
introduced at trial established Berryhill & CO., not Mosell Equities, deducted the expenses for 
the Restaurant and accompanying space. 
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Mosell Equities was not making "unsecured loans" as Justice Eisemann suggests; Mosell 
Equities was making loans based on the promised security of stock in Berryhill & Company, 
Inc., which Berryhill refused to tender after Mosell paid Berryhill $405,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 59(a)(6), IRCP, provides a mechanism for the Court to intercede and grant a new 
trial when the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. Obviously, when a Court is 
"shocked" by the verdict, after having heard the testimony and having evaluated the credibility 
of the witnesses, a new trial is warranted. Whether you believed Mosell Equities' contention the 
funds were a loan pending the buy-in or Berryhill's claim the contract was a straight stock 
purchase, there was undeniably an express contract. A verdict finding no express contract was 
against the weight of any of the evidence. 
Moreover, a verdict finding there was no breach of either contract was against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Either the funds were a loan, which Berryhill refused to acknowledge or 
repay, or the funds were consideration for purchase of stock in Berryhill & CO., which Berryhill 
refused to deliver. Again, no question a verdict that no breach occurred is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
Mosell Equities contends the Court was right on in its assessment of the evidence, and 
particularly in its finding that Berryhill was not credible. Accordingly, it would be a travesty and 
offend justice to let this verdict stand. Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial and it 
respectfully requests the Court grant this motion. 
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O£PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU1\rTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
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vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2009-09974 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case arises from a failed business deal between Plaintiff Mosell Equities. LLC 
(hereinafter "Mosell Equities") and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Berryhill & Company"). Mosell Equities filed its initial Complaint on May 28, 2009 and its 
Amended Complaint on September 14, 2009. The Amended Complaint alleged six causes of 
action against Berryhill & Company for: (l) Count I (breach of contract); (2) Count 11 (breach 
of an implied-in-fact contract); (3) Count III (quasi-contract/unjust enrichment); (4) Count IV 
(conversion); (5) Count V (fraud in the inducement); and (6) Count VI (piercing the corporate 
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veil). 1 Berryhill & Company answered the Amended Complaint and filed its own 
counterclaim alleging a single count for fraud in the inducement on December 2L 2009.~ Each 
of the alleged claims, except for piercing the corporate veil, was tried before a jury in 
September 2010. The jury returned a verdict denying affirmative relief on Counts I, 11. IIL and 
V of the Amended Complaint and the single count for fraud in the inducement alleged in the 
counterclaim. The jury granted Mosell Equities relief on its conversion claim, a\\ arding 
$2.016.85. 
Shortly thereafter, Mosell Equities moved this Court for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or, in the alternative. a new trial.3 In a hearing on October 7, 2010. the Court issued an 
oral ruling granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Count I of the Amended 
Complaint for breach of contract, but otherwise denied the motion. Because the Court granted 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in part, the Court concluded the motion for a ne\\ trial 
was moot and did not make an oral ruling granting or denying that motion. Berryhill & 
Company appealed the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Count I and Mosell 
Equities cross-appealed.4 The Idaho Supreme Court took the appeal and issued a Remittitur 
reversing this Court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Count I and 
remanding the case to this Court with instructions to determine whether to grant Mosell 
Equities a new trial on Count 1. 5 
1 See generally Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 9/14/2009. 
2 See generally Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 12/21/2009. 
3 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the verdict, or in the Alternative, 
Motion for New Trial, filed 9/21 /20 I 0. 
~Notice of Appeal, filed 12/6/2010; Notice ofCross-Appeal, filed 12/17/2010. 
' Remittitur, filed 3/28/2013. 
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On May 3, 2013, Mosell Equities moved this Court for a new trial on Count 1.6 
Berryhill & Company opposed the motion.~ Mosel! Equities replied. 8 This matter came before 
the Court for oral argument on July 11, 2013. During oral argument, the Court orally granted 
the motion for a new trial. The Court indicated that it would issue this written ruling to clarify 
its analysis and conclusions. In issuing its oral and written rulings, the Court considered the 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand; 
the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and 
Remand; Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial 
following Appeal and Remand: and the at1idavit of Chris Pierce. 
Finally, the Court notes the factual background of this case is extensive. This Court 
has already set forth substantial factual background in an April 30, 2010 summary judgment 
<lecision,9 in its October 7. 2010 oral ruling on the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, and in its July 11. 2013 oral ruling on the motion for a new trial. The Court does not 
reiterate all of that factual background here. but instead sets forth only those facts which have 
been submitted for purposes of determining whether Mosell Equities is entitled to a new trial. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
''Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) authorizes an aggrieved party to make a motion 
for a new trial on one of several specified grounds." Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark. Inc .. 
150 Idaho 240, 247, 245 P.3d 992, 999 (2010). One such ground is set forth in Rule 59(a)(6). 
6 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand, filed 5/3/2013. 
7 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand, filed 6/4/2013. 
8 Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand, 
6/17/2013. 
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which provides "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." "Any motion based on [Rule 
59(a)(6)] ... must set forth the factual grounds therefor with particularity." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7). 
To determine whether to grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6), a trial court is required 
to apply a two prong test: 
The first prong directs the trial judge to consider whether the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence and if the ends of justice would be served by 
vacating the verdict. The second prong . . . directs the trial court to consider 
whether a different result would follow in a retrial. The second prong requires 
more than a mere possibility; there must be a probability that a different result 
would be obtained in a new trial. 
Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003). The Idaho Supreme Court 
also explained: 
The judge does not have unlimited authority to disturb the verdict of a jury. 
Respect for the function of the jury prevents the granting of a new trial except 
in unusual circumstances. The trial judge is not required to view the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the verdict-winner. Although the mere fact that the 
evidence is in conflict is not enough to set aside the verdict and grant a new 
trial, when a motion for a new trial is based on the ground that the verdict is 
against the weight of the evidence, the judge is free to weigh the conflicting 
evidence for himself. 
Id. See also Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 430, 196 P .3d 341, 348 (2008) 
(summarizing that "[a] trial judge may grant a new trial on that ground if, after making his or 
her own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the judge 
determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence"). 
9 Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Motions to Strike. Motion 
to Amend Complaint, and Motion to Compel, filed 4/30/2013. 
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Further, ""[t]he trial court is given broad discretion in this ruling." Karlson v. Harris. 
140 Idaho 561, 568, 97 P.3d 428,435 (2004). Thus, "[t]he trial judge may set aside the 
verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support it." Id. "[T]he trial judge must 
disclose his reasoning for granting or denying motions for a new trial ... unless those reasons 
are obvious from the record itself." Quickv. Crane, 111 Idaho 759. 772. 727P.2d1187. 1200 
( 1986). "The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed ... under an abuse of 
discretion standard." Kuhn, supra. 
Motion to Strike 
Mosell Equities moves this Court to strike the Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand because it exceeds the page 
limits set forth in the Local Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division for the Fourth 
Judicial District. 10 Specifically, Rule 8 of the Local Rules states such memoranda are not to 
exceed twenty-five (25) pages. Defendant's memorandum is thirty-two (32) pages, including 
the cover page and the certificate of service. Although Berryhill & Company has not filed a 
motion seeking an order allowing the filing of the memorandum over the page limit, the Court 
noted at oral argument and reiterates here that Defendant's memorandum was not redundant 
or otherwise improper. The Court DENIES the motion to strike. 
Summary Judgment 
ANALYSIS 
In its Remittitur, the Idaho Supreme Court made clear the only issue remaining before 
this Court is whether Mosell Equities should be granted a new trial on Count I of its Amended 
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Complaint for breach of an express contract. 11 Applying the foregoing legal standard to the 
issue before this Court, a new trial is warranted on Count I only if this Court concludes: (I) 
the jury verdict that there was no express contract which \Vas breached is not in accord with 
the clear weight of the evidence and the ends of justice would be served by vacating the 
verdict; and (2) there is a probability that a new jury will conclude there is an express contract 
which was breached if this Court orders a new trial. The Court addresses each of these issues 
in turn below. 
I. \Vhether the jury verdict that there "as no express contract ,, hich "as 
breached is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and the 
ends of justice would be sened by vacating the Yerdict. 
The Idaho Supreme Court correct!:, noted this Court's determination of this i:--:-uc must 
he based upon the jury instructions ,vhich \\Cre given to the jury. not the instruction:- ,, hich 
this Court and the parties believe should have been gi,en to the jury. 1~ The Court has 
t\:,ie\\Cd all of the jury instructions in this case in making the follo,,ing determinations. !he 
jury instructions included the Special Verdict form which was utilized by the jury in making 
its determinations at the end of the jury trial. Li Question \lo. 1 of the Spc,.:ial Verdict a-.,h.'-·LI till' 
jury: "'\Vas there an express contract betv.cen Plaintiff \loscll Equities. ILC and Defendant 
Berryhill & Company, Inc. which ,vas breached'?'' The jury·s answer to (Jucstion \:o. I ,vas 
simply '"No." l\o jury instruction informed the jury that there was a contract het,,een the 
10 Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Remand. 
filed 6/11/2013. 
11 Remittitur, p. 14. 
12 ld, pp. 7-8 (citing Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,867 fn. 6,292 P.3d 248,258 fn. 6 (2012) (summarizing 
that ''[a] party who fails to properly object to an instruction that misstates the law cannot circumvent Rule 51 (b) 
by arguing insufficiency of the evidence, based upon a correct statement of the law" but instead "the sufficiency 
of the evidence must be determined based upon the jury instructions given, not upon those that shou Id have been 
given'')). 
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parties as a matter of law. 14 No jury instruction limited the scope of the contract which the 
jury could find (e.g. the jury instructions did not limit the scope of the contract to being a 
loan). 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted that because Question No. 1 is a compound question. 
it is impossible to know whether the jury found that there was no express contract. or whether 
the jury found that there was an express contract but it simply was not breached. i:- Because the 
jury could have made either finding. the Idaho Supreme Court concluded this Court could not 
grant a judgment not\vithstanding the verdict unless the Court concluded reasonable minds 
could not have answered both of the questions in the manner the jury did. 16 This same 
principle equally applies to this Court's determination of whether to grant a new trial. Thus. to 
grant a nc\V trial. this Couti must conclude: ( 1) a verdict that there was no express contract is 
against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) a verdict that the contract was not breached is 
against the clear weight of the evidence; and (3) the ends of justice would be served by 
vacating the verdict. Any other finding would require this Court to decline to grant a new trial. 
The Cou1i considers these separate aspects of the compound question contained in Question 
No. 1 in turn below. 
13 Special Verdict, filed 9/15/2010. 
14 Further, when it granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this Court stated that Judge Williamson had 
decided at summary judgment that there was a contract between the parties as a matter of law. The Idaho 
Supreme Court made clear in its Remittitur that this Court was incorrect in its interpretation of Judge 
Williamson's decision and such decision did not grant summary judgment that there was an express contract. See 
Remittitur, pp. 9-10. 
is Id., p. 8. 
16 Id., pp. 8-9. 
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A. \Vhether a wnlict that there was no express contract is against tht 
clear weight of the evidence. 
The Court first notes the Idaho Supreme Court concluded. based up()n the legal 
standard applicable to motions for judgment notv,ithstanding the pleadings. the Court erred in 
concluding there was insufficient evidence to support the j ur~( s \ erdict on Question No. 1. 1 -
fkcausl· the issue \\as hefon:· the lc!Jho Supreme Court on a judgment not\\ Ilhstanding thl· 
verdict. the court \\as required to admit the truth of all of Defendant· s evidence and ever) 
legitimate inference that could be drawn from that evidence in the light mnst favorable to 
Defendant. 18 As this Court set forth above. that is not the legal standard before this Court 
when determining whether to grant a new trial. Instead. this Court is entitled to weigh the 
e\idence without vie\,ing the evidence in favor of the vcrdict-\,inner. Sl't aside the verdict. 
and grant a new trial even if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Sc"c' 
.Johannsen, supra: Karlson, supra. 
The remaining jury instructions most pertinent to the Court·s determination regarding 
the formation of an express contract are Instruction Nos. 3-9. and 11. Instruction No. 3 sets 
forth that Mosell Equities had the burden of proving each of the four elements of a breach of 
contract claim, including proving that a contract existed between Mosell Equities and 
Berryhill & Company. Instruction No. 4 sets forth the requirements for a valid contract and 
the parties therein stipulate to all the requirements for a valid contract, except the parties 
dispute whether there was mutual agreement by all the parties to all essential terms of any 
alleged contract. Regarding this final requirement, Instruction No. 5 sets forth: 
17 Id., pp. 7-9. 
18 Id. (citing Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 ( 1986)). 
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In this case, the defendant alleges that all parties did not agree to all essential 
terms of the contract. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the ·meeting 
of the minds,' and means that all parties to a contract must have understood 
and accepted all of the essential terms of the contract. 
There is no contract unless all of the essential terms have been communicated 
to all parties, understood by all parties, and accepted by all parties. 
Instruction No. 6 explains that a contract may be written or oral. Instruction No. 7 sets forth: 
Ordinarily, a contract results when negotiations are complete and all essential 
terms have been agreed upon. This is true even though the parties expect to put 
their agreement in writing. However, if the parties have agreed not to be bound 
until their agreement is reduced to writing. no contract results until this is done. 
Instruction No. 8 explains that an express contract may consist of an offer and an acceptance. 
and elaborates on those requirements. Instruction No. 9 explains that silence may operate as 
acceptance under certain enumerated circumstances. Instruction No. 11 explains that the terms 
of the contract are in dispute and sets forth the legal rules the jury was to apply in determining 
what was intended by the parties, including that the language of any contract must be given its 
ordinary meaning unless the jury found from the evidence that a special meaning was 
intended. 
Here, Glenn \\TOte a check to Berryhill & Company for $50,000.00 dated June 28. 
2007. 19 The check was written out of the account of Mosell Equities.20 The memo line of the 
check says ·'Loan:· In a handwritten note underneath a photocopy of the check. John and 
Glenn sign their names below the following statement: 
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses 
during our bookeeper [sic] transition. It will go into the general check register 
+ be used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co. 
19 The check was submitted as evidence to the jury as Exhibit I and will hereafter be referred to as Exhibit I. 
20 Id. 
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It will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in'' of Moberry Venture Corp. 
Inc.21 
Glenn issued nine additional checks to Berryhill & Company, each out of the account of 
Mose II Equities, none of which were accompanied by a similar handwritten note signed by the 
parties. Instead, the issued checks contained the following relevant information: ( 1) a July 30. 
2007 check for $25,000.00 with ''Loan·· written in the memo line; (2) an August 7. 2007 
check for $25,000.00 with "Loan - Tl's'" written in the memo line; (3) an August 16. 2007 
check for $25,000.00 with "Loan# 4'' written in the memo line; (4) another August 16, 2007 
check for $25.000.00 with "Loan# 5" written in the memo line; (5) an October 9, 2007 check 
for $60,000.00 with "Kitchen Equip Loan'' written in the memo line; ( 6) an October 26. 2007 
check for $100.000.00 with "Loan" written in the memo line; (7) a December 4, 2007 check 
for $25.000.00 with "Loan .. written in the memo line: (8) a December 19, 2007 check for 
$50,000.00 with "Loan" written in the memo line; and (9) a June 30, 2008 check for 
$20,000.00 with ··Suite 101 Tl's" written in the memo line. 22 Adding all the amounts of all 10 
checks yields the sum of $405,000.00 issued to Berryhill & Company. 
Mosell Equities contends the handwritten note which both Glenn and John signed 
underneath the June 28, 2007 check constitutes a legally enforceable contract wherein Mosell 
Equities loaned Berryhill & Company $50,000.00 which loan was either to be transitioned 
into shareholder equity in "Moberry Venture Corp. Inc." or paid back in the event the 
transition never took place.23 Mosell Equities also contends that the subsequent checks were 
21 Id. 
22 These checks were submitted as evidence to the jury as Exhibits 3 through I I and are hereafter referred to as 
Exhibits 3 through 11. 
2; Mosell's Memo. in Supp. New Trial, pp. 4-17. 
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all part of this same loan transaction.2-t Ben-yhill & Company responds that the evidence docs 
not support the argument that the parties contemplated a lender-borrower relationship. but 
instead the parties were clearly structuring a ""buy-in."2" Both parties rely on extrinsic 
evidence to support their contention regarding the formation of the purported contract and the 
interpretation of the language of the purported contract. 
In addition to the foregoing checks and signed note, Moscll Equities relies on evidence 
submitted to the jury, including the testimony of Joy Luedtke (hereinafter ··Luedtke .. ) (the 
general manager and bookkeeper for Beryhill & Company from October 2007 through 
October 2008) and a June 30, 2008 balance sheet of Berryhill & Company submitted to the 
jury as Exhibit 53, which shows that the $405,000.00 issued to Berryhill & Company were 
accounted for on its financial books as "Long Term Liabilities" to "'Mosell Equities LLC.''26 
Mo sell Equities also relies on Luedtke' s testimony that she and John considered possible 
sources of repayment of the funds issued to Berryhill & Company, and that John newr told 
her that the funds were not a loan.27 Mosell Equities cites to Exhibit 37, which contains an e-
mail by Amy Dempsey (hereinafter ""Dempsey''), the CPA of Berryhill & Company. \\hich 
oddly refers to the funds as "donated in 2007 [and] on the books as a loan."28 Glenn·s own 
testimony is that he understood the funds to be loans that "would either be repaid to me. as a 
loan would be. or that loan \vould be comerted to equity or stock in Berryhill & Company.--2'1 
2~ Id. 
25 Defendant's Memo. in Opp. New Trial, p. 28. 
26 Mosel l's Memo. in Supp. New Trial, pp. 7-8. 
27 Id., p. 8. 
28 Id.. pp. 8-9. 
29 Id., pp. 9-10. 
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Glenn also testified that the first time he heard John dispute the funds as a loan was in 
response to a demand for repayment sent to Mosell Equities in April 2009.30 
Mosell Equities also relies on a series of documents which were never signed but 
constitute a course of conduct that evidences the intent of the parties. For example, an attorney 
named L. Victoria Meier (hereinafter "Meier") met with Glenn and John in January 2008 and 
drafted several corporate documents that identified her understanding of what had transpired 
between Glenn and John as of their meeting.31 These documents, submitted to the jury as 
Exhibit 35, include the following: (1) the Berryhill & Company, Inc. Special Meeting of the 
Board of Directors and Shareholders, dated effective December 31, 2007; (2) a Stock 
Purchase Agreement; and (3) a Satisfaction of Loan.32 Mosell Equities emphasizes certain 
portions of each document as evidencing the intent of the parties that the $405,000.00 issued 
to Berryhill & Company constituted a loan. 
Specifically, the Berryhill & Company, Inc. Special Meeting document contains the 
following relevant excerpts: 
WHEREAS, the Company [Berryhill & Company, Inc.] has borrowed 
Four Hundred Thousand Dollars from Glenn E. Mosell for the funding of the 
relocation of the Company's restaurant to a new location and for the capital 
improvements to be made to the restaurant and banquet rooms. 
WHEREAS, Glenn E. Mosell desires to acquire an interest in the 
Company in exchange for, and as repayment of, the amount lent to the 
Company. 
RESOLVED, that upon receipt of the Satisfaction of Loan evidencing 
that the Company's obligation to Mosell has been paid, the Directors are 
hereby authorized to issue two hundred (200) shares of the one dollar ($1) par 
value common capital stock of the Company to Mosell. 
30 Id., p. 10. 
3 I Id. 
32 Id., pp. I 1-12. 
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The Stock Purchase Agreement contains the following relevant excerpts: 
WHEREAS, during the calendar year of 2007, Mosell loaned the 
Corporation [Berryhill & Company, Inc.] Four Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($400,000) to fund the relocation of the Corporation's restaurant and for capital 
improvements needed for the Corporation's Restaurant and banquet rooms (the 
"Loan"). 
WHEREAS, the Corporation desires to issue two hundred (200) shares 
of the Corporation's common capital stock to Mosell as repayment of the Loan. 
Mosell desires to accept the two hundred (200) shares of the Corporation's 
common capital stock as repayment of the Loan and to have the Loan 
reclassified on the Corporation's books and records as a capital contribution 
from Mosell. 
WHEREAS, the Directors of the Corporation and the Shareholder 
[John Berryhill] have agreed that it is in the best interest of the Corporation to 
authorize and to admit Mosell as a shareholder of the Corporation and to 
reclassify the Loan as a capital contribution from Mosell as payment for the 
two hundred (200) shares pursuant to the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements contained herein, Corporation, Shareholder, and Mosell agree as 
follows: 
3. Payment of Subscription Price. Mosell shall pay the Subscription 
Price by canceling the Loan and thereafter authorizing the Corporation to 
reclassify the Loan on the Corporation's books and records as a capital 
contribution from Mosell to the Corporation. 
The Satisfaction of Loan contains the following relevant excerpt: 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that GLENN E. 
MOSELL, a married man dealing with his sole and separate property. does 
hereby certify and declare that the certain Loan in the original amount of Four 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000) made and entered into by 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, an Idaho corporation, as "borrower .. , to 
GLENN E. MOSELL, as "lender", is fully paid, satisfied and discharged. 
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Mosell Equities argues John had opportunities at trial to testify the "loan" language in these 
documents was in some way incorrect, but never did so.33 Finally, Mosell Equities relies on 
John's testimony that John did not believe he got to keep the money if there was no transition 
to the aforementioned "buy-in."34 
Berryhill & Company acknowledges all of these references to the funds being a '·loan,. 
but argue that the parties intended a special meaning for the word "loan."35 Berryhill & 
Company relies extensively on the trial testimony of John. For example, John testified that he 
never understood the funds to be a loan. 36 John testified that when he saw the word '·loan·· 
used on the memo line of the June 28, 2007 check, he asked Glenn why the check was labeled 
a loan and Glenn responded that they had to call the funds something. 37 John testified he 
understood they had to call the funds something so the funds could be put in the books and for 
certain unclear tax purposes.38 John testified Glenn referred to the term '·loan" as simply an 
"interim substitute" while the funds were waiting to be transitioned into the "buy-in. "39 
Berryhill & Company also relies on the testimony of Dempsey, the CPA of Berryhill & 
Company. For example, Dempsey testified she did not completely understand the end goals of 
Glenn and John or what they were trying to achieve.40 Dempsey testified there was no clear 
definition of what the funds were or what they were for and Glenn was never really clear that 
11 Id., p. 14. 
3
~ Id., p. 17. 
35 See generally Defendant's Memo. in Opp. New Trial. 
16 Id., p. 13. 
17 Id. 
1s Id. 
39 Id., p. 14. 
~o Id., p. 15. 
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the funds were a loan. 41 Dempsey acknowledged the funds were accounted in the books of 
Berryhill & Company as long-term liabilities but says term signified the funds were in a 
holding pattern until there was legal documentation to define hov.. to treat the funds.-1 2 
Berryhill & Company also cites to the testimony of Kimbell Gourley (hereinafter 
"Gourley"). an attorney who was hired by Glenn and John. The parties met with Gourley on 
March 6. 2007. prior to the issuance of any of the aforementioned checks. to discuss the 
proposed formation of a new corporation to be known as MoBerry Corporation.43 Gourley 
understood John and Mosell Equities were to become shareholders of the ne\\ corporation_-1-1 
Gourley testified it was never his understanding that the shareholder buy-in of MoBerr~ 
Corporation transaction was going to take the form of a loan.45 Gourley testified that 
structuring the buy-in as a loan would be inconsistent with a capital contribution into a 
· 46 corporat10n. 
Finally. Berryhill & Company relies extensively on evidence submitted at trial 
regarding the proposed Polo Cove real estate development in Canyon County. ln so relying. 
Berryhill & Company attempts to explain that the disputed funds were given to it as only a 
part of a greater complex transaction or partnership among the parties that involved using 
Berryhill & Company to market and brand the proposed Polo Cove development. The Court 
will not reiterate all of the extensive evidence submitted by Berryhill & Company regarding 
the Polo Cove development, but the Court has reviewed all of the submitted evidence several 
41 Id., pp. 15-16. 
42 Id., p. 16. 
4
~ Id., p. 12. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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times m considering this motion. The Court will briefly summanze Defendant's key 
"d 47 ev1 ence. 
Berryhill & Company offers evidence that Glenn wanted to utilize the Berryhill & 
Company reputation and expertise to support the proposed Polo Cove development. There 
was an understanding that there was value or "brand equity" in having Berryhill & Company 
involved in the development. Mosell Equities paid John as a consultant to work on the Polo 
Cove development. John spent substantial amounts of time on the Polo Cove development. At 
the urging of Glenn, John moved his restaurant to downtown Boise and signed a lease for the 
new location on April 12, 2007. The new restaurant location was meant to attract investors for 
the Polo Cove development and to show the essence of the Polo Cove development. It was 
only a couple months later that Glenn issued the first check to Berryhill & Company on June 
28, 2007 for $50,000.00 at least in part for the expenses of the new downtown restaurant 
location. Just a few months after Berryhill & Company moved to the new downtown location. 
Glenn and John expanded the downtown restaurant location to include additional space to 
showcase the Polo Cove development. The cost of remodeling the new restaurant location was 
$100,048.43 and the cost for the expansion space was $193,801.29. Thus, Berryhill & 
Company argues, the bulk of the funds given to Berryhill & Company went toward paying 
these ·'tenant improvements." Shortly thereafter, the Polo Cove development was shelved and 
Glenn sent John several communications wherein Glenn discussed wanting to talk to John 
about his "investment/divestment" in Berryhill & Company and "to go over [his] capital 
46 Id. 
47 The full statement of facts is contained in Defendant's MeRlo. in Opp. New Trial, pp. 4-22. 
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contributions with John." Defendant's conclusion is simply that the word '·loan·' had a 
"special meaning," which was that it was just a label for tax purposes. 
Weighing all the evidence submitted, including the key evidence summarized above. 
the Court concludes a verdict that there ,vas no express contract is against the ckar weight of 
the evidence. In so doing, the Court reiterates many of its same findings and conclusions set 
forth in its October 7, 2010 ruling from the bench granting Mosel! Equities judgment 
not\vithstanding the verdict and in its July 1 L 2013 ruling from the bench granting Mosel! 
Equities a ne,v trial. Specifically, Exhibit 1 is a signed writing containing the clear. 
unambiguous language that the June 28, 2007 $50,000.00 check '·is a loan .. bdwcen iv1osel I 
Equities which provided the funds and Berryhill & Company. which accepted the funds. The 
funds were provided to pay for the move to downtO\vn and the agreement was written and 
signed that it was to be treated as a loan to cover miscellaneous dO\vnto,vn expenses during a 
bookkeeper transition. The funds were to go into the general check register and to be used for 
any bi! ling of payables needed for the downtovm location or Berry hi 11 & Company. The 
language of the signed ,,Titing indicated that this loan ··will be transitioned into part of 
Glenn's 'buy in' of Maberry Venture Corp. Inc." The unsigned documents contained in 
Exhibit 35 which were drafted by an attorney on behalf of Glenn and John after l:xhibit 1 ,vas 
signed evidences the intent of Mosell Equities and Berryhill & Company that the loan he 
transitioned into a "buy-in:· The testimony indicating that the loan was an ·'interim substitute" 
was that it was an "interim substitute" for the "buy-in." This was the requisite meeting of the 
minds. There was no testimony that the loan was an "interim substitute'' for buying branding 
or any other exchange. 
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All of the exhibits and testimony, taken as a whole, show the clear weight of the 
evidence is that there was an express contract that the loan was an "interim substitute" to be 
transitioned into a "buy-in" of MoBerry Venture Corp. The Cou11 next considers whether a 
verdict that the contract \Vas not breached is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
B. ·whether a verdict that the contract was not breached is against the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
As with the Court's determination above. the Coui1 must begin by considering what 
jury instructions were submitted to the jury which specifically regarded the element of breach. 
The Court has again reviewed all of the jury instructions. The jury instructions most pertinent 
to the Court·s determination regarding the breach of an express contract are Instruction Nos. 3 
and 15. Instruction No. 3 sets forth that Mosell Equities had the burden of proving each of the 
four elements of a breach of contract claim, including proving that any contract which existed 
between Mosell Equities and Berryhill & Company was breached by Berryhill & Company. 
Instruction No. 15 instructs the jury that if it found a contract exists between Mosell Equities 
and Berryhill & Company, the jury was to determine what a reasonable time would be for the 
performance of the contract under the circumstances of this case. 
It is undisputed that Mosell Equities paid Berryhill & Company $405,000.00. It is 
undisputed thm the proposed buy-in never happened - Berryhill & Company never gave 
Mosel! Equities shares in the proposed MoBerry Corporation or the established Berryhill & 
Company. The Cow1 notes that although there was no time for performance given in the 
contract ... the law implies that performance must occur within a reasonable time." McFurlanJ 
v. Joint School Dist. No 365,108 Idaho 519,522.700 P.2d 141,144 (Ct. App. 1985). The 
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initial signed writing occurred on or about June 28. 2007. It has been nearly six years to the 
day of this initial signed writing without the provided funds being transitioned into a "buy-in ... 
Based on the Court's review of all the evidence. more than six years to transition the funds 
into a ··buy-in'· is an unreasonable time for performance. Thus, although Mosel] Equities 
performed its obligations to Berryhill & Company under the contract by providing the 
requisite funds, Berryhill & Company did not completely perform its obi igations v,ithin a 
reasonable time by failing to transition the funds into a '·buy-in." Therefore, the clear weight 
of the evidence establishes that Berryhill & Company breached the express contract. The· 
Court notes that although the evidence offered by Berryhill & Company regarding Pohi Cove 
and the value of the branding of Berryhill & Company to Moscll Equities is not sufficient to 
cstabl ish the absence of the aforementioned express contract and breach. such evidence may 
go to the issue of partial performance and damages if those items are considered rccei, c:d by 
Mosel l Equities in exchange for its $405,000.00. 
C. Whether the ends of justice would be served by vacating the 
verdict. 
Based on the foregoing. the Comi concludes that the ends of justice would be served 
bv vacating the verdict because there was an express contract between the parties which was 
breached and the parties are entitled to have a reasonable jury try these issues. 
II. \Vhether there is a probability that a nen· jury will conclude there is an 
express contract which was breached if this Court orders a new trial. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the jury on retrial wi II find contrary 
to the first jury by finding an express contract that Berryhill & Company breached by failing 
to perform within a reasonable period of time. See rvarren. supra (explaining that .. [i]n order 
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to find that a different result would occur in a retrial. the district judge must conclude that the 
jury on retrial would"' find contrary to the first jury). 
III. \Vhether the Court should deny the motion for a new trial even if all of the 
above is true. 
Berryhill & Company spent a significant portion of oral argument contending that even 
if all of the above is true, the motion for a new trial shoukl still be denied. Specifically. 
Berryhill & Company argued Mosell Equities has based its entire case on the express contract 
being a simple loan which was breached by Berryhill & Company when it foiled to repay the 
loan in cash. Berryhill & Company thus contends that l'v1osell Equities cannot now be granted 
a ne,v trial on the theory that the express contract was for a buy-in which was breached by 
Berryhill & Company when it failed to follow through with transitioning the funds into a buy-
in. In so arguing, Berryhill & Company referenced Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373. 788 P.:2d 
188 ( 1990). 
In Heit:::, the Idaho Supreme Court summarized .. [ \\]here a plainti1T has chosen to 
submit his case upon certain issues or theories, they are bound by choices, and it is error for 
the trial court to aJterward grant one party a new trial on the basis that the plaintiff might have 
prevailed had it raised a different issue.'· Id. at 378. 788 P.2d at 193. Based on this rule. the 
court in Heitz concluded that a trial cow1 erred ··in ruling on a motion f'or a new trial ... [by] 
concluding that the special verdict form should have included other legal theories than those 
which the pm1ies chose to submit to the jury." Id. Significantly, the court's determination of 
what issues were submitted to the jury was based on what issues the jury was asked to 
determine in the special verdict form. Id 
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In this case. the relevant portion of the special verdict form submitt..:d to th..: it1n \,as 
in ()ucstion No. 1: ··Was there an express contract hctv,ccn Plaintiff \l()s..,;ll l:qt1itics. 1.1.C. 
and Dcfond,mt Berryhill & Company, [nc. which \'las brt?achcdT Quc~tion !\o. 1 l',1ntains th) 
language that ltrnits the jury to dctcm1ining \\hcther therL: was an express contract oct\\,:cn Llk' 
rx1rtics that \\as a loan. In fact. the word ··Joan"" or any descriptfon of a ··Joan·· \Vas nc\ er 
indudcd in any of the questions in the special verdict form or in att: of the instructions 
submitte<l to the jury. Although the parti .. ~s may now contt:nd that the form and ins11 udi,H1-. 
which wen: given to the jury were fla,vcd. this Court is bound In rc\'it'\\ the ju!") ·s ,ct diet in 
light of the instructions tht: jury actually received and not the instruction:-. lilL' j,ir) shouid h,n c 
n:cciH:<l. See Bolognese. supra. Thus, this Court is "Within its discretion 10 grant a new trial if 
the dear weight of the evidence establishes any express contract between the parties \.\ bich 
was breached. 111e Court has done so. The issue of the scope of the claim Moscll Equitii,;s 
actually stated in its Amended Complaint is not currently before this Court. Therefore. the 
contention of Berryhill & Company is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Tilt> Court GRANTS the motion for a new trial and vacates the jur:,. ·s ,crdicL 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Daled this /2 ~day of August 2013. . 
/~) 
/ ,,- , .· ,./ 
~~-~.a;ff 
Senior District Judge 
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I hereby certify that on the __d_1ay of August 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ERIC R. CLARK 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. BOX 2504 
EAGLE, ID 83616 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9TH STREET, SUITE 300 
P.O. BOX 1776 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
B~ctCoUP,L 
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AUG 2 0 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MARTHA LYKE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOlJRTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TT JEST A TE Of IDAHO, IN AND FOR Tl IE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff 
YS. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III and 
AMY BERRYIULL, individually, and as 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2009-09974 
ORD.ER GRANTING 
NEW TRIAL 
Pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Decision filed August 19, 2013, a ne\~- jury trial 
is ordered. Furthermore, the parties are ordered to submit, within fourteen (14) days of the 
date of this order, their available dates for jury trial. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. 
Dated this ,1f.?:1 _:~"day of August 2013. 
""'Dennis E. Goff 
Senior District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL- PAGE 1 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
d-
i hereby certify that on the d-0 day of August 2013, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ERIC R. CLARK 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. BOX 2504 
EAGLE, ID 83616 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9TH STREET, SUITE 300 
P.O. BOX 1776 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
CHRISTOPHER D. PJCH 
Clerk pf the District Court 
By~~ 
Deputy CleD( 
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-
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
121 N. 9th St., Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellant 
A.,...Ml ____ FU..eo_1P.M. 2 ~b 
AUG 2 2 2013 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH. Cleek 
ByKATHYllltl. 
Depillf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
-vs-
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL III and AMY BERRYHILL, 
individually, and as husband and wife, 
Defendants/Appellant. 
Case No. CV OC 0909974 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MOSELL EQUITIES, AND ITS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ERIC R. CLARK, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I. Defendant, Berryhill & Company, Inc., appeals against the above-named Plaintiff, 
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting New Trial entered on the 20th day of 
August, 2013, by the Honorable Dennis Goff, Senior District Judge. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- I 
z;; 
000114
-
2. Appellant hereby appeals as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
above-referenced Order Granting New Trial, which is deemed to include all interlocutory 
judgments, orders and decrees as provided under Idaho Appellate Rule l 7( e ). 
3. The issue the Appellant intends to assert on appeal is that the court erred in 
granting Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand. 
4. Appellant, Berryhill & Company, Inc., has a right to appeal since the Order 
described in paragraph l above is an appealable order as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 
1 l(a)(5). 
5. Appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's transcript in hard copy and 
electronic format. 
6. Appellant requests a scanned copy of the clerk's record to include the following 
documents in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
(a) all correspondence directed by the parties to the Court; and 
(b) all correspondence between the parties which the Court received copies of. 
7. I hereby certify that: 
(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript of the July l l, 2013 hearing on Plaintiffs Motion 
for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand. 
( c) the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's supplemental record has 
been paid; 
( d) the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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( e) service of this notice has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 2~ 
DATED this~day of August, 2013 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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CERT~ATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22 day of August, 2013, I served a copy of the foregoing 
instrument on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. 0. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
and mailed a copy to the court reporter at: 
Penny Tardiff 
Ada County Transcript Dept. 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St., Room 4171 
Boise, ID 83702 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
Via Facsimile - 939-7136 
vVia U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
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-
nANlF:l, K wn ,J .TA MS (TSB 3920) 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LT.P 
121 N. 9th SL, Suite 300 
J>. O. Rox 1776 
lloise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw(u),thomuswi11inmsh1w.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/AJlpcllant 
N0·--::::---=~----0: OO FILED A.M. P.M. ___ _ 
SEP O 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By BRADLEY J. THIES 
DEPUTY 
JN THR DISTRICT COURT OF THE lt'OlJRTH JlHHCIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE 011' IUAIJO, TN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho limited 
linbilily company, 
Plaintiff/Rc."pondent, 
ll.1£.RRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., un 
Idaho corporation, JOHN .1£. 
BERRYHILL Ill and AMY BERRYHILL, 
individually, and as husband and wife, 
Uefendants/A1lpcllan t. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 41338-2013 
Ada County No. CV OC 0909974 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APP.1£AL 
TO: THR ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, MOS.1£LL .I£QlllTIF.S, AND ITS 
A'lTORNEY OF RF.CORD, ERIC R. CLARK, AND THE CLERK OF THR 
AllOVE-.1£NTlTL~l> COURT 
NOTICE TS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. T>efendanl, Rerryhill & Company, Inc., appeals against the above-named T"laintin: 
Lo lhe Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granling New Trial enlere<l on lhc 20th day of 
August. 2013, by the Honorable Dennis Gol'I~ Senior District Judge. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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2. AppeHanL hereby appeals as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court Ii-om lhe 
ahove-relerenced Order Granting New Trial, which is deemed to include all inLerlocuLory 
judgments, orders and decrees a~ provided under [daho Appellate Rule l 7(e). 
3. The issue the AppcJlant intends to assert on appeal is that Lhe courl erred in 
granting Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand. 
4. Appc1lant. Berryhill & Company, Tnc., has a righL Lo appeal since the Order 
described in puragraph l above is an uppealablc order as defined in ldaho Appellate Rule 
l .l(a)(5). 
5. Appellant requests the preparation of the reporter's transcript of the July 11, 2013 
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand in hard copy and 
electronic format. 
6. Appellant requests a scanned copy of the clerk's record Lo include the following 
documents in additjon to tho~e aulomaLically include<! under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
(a) a copy of the Memorandum in Support of Plaintilrs Motion ror New TriaJ 
Jlollowing Appeal and Remand1 dated May l, 2013; 
(b) a copy of the Memorandum in Opposition lo PlainLilT's Motion Jor New 
trial Following Appeal and Remand. dated June 4, 2013; 
(c) a copy of the Affidavit of Chris Pierce in Support orPiaintiffs Motion for 
New Trial Following Appeal and Remand, dated June 4, 2013; 
(cl) a copy of Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for New 
Trial Following Appeal and Remand, dated June 17, 2013; 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPF.AI, - 2 
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7. T hereby t:erLily thal: 
(a) a copy of this Amended NoLic;e of Appeal has been served on the rcpo11cr: 
(b) the clerk or the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the rcpo1tcr's transcript of I.he July 11,201.1 heming on PlaintiJrs Motion 
for New Trial Following Appeal and Remand. 
(c) the estimated fee forpreparaLion or Lhl:! clerk's supplemental record has 
heen pait.l; 
(d) the appellate filing lee has been paid; and 
(e) service of this amended notice has been made upon all pm Lies rel1uircd ~o 
be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
~ 
DA TED this -~. day of September, 2013 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants/ AppellanL 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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-
~005/005 
.. \ 
CF.RTTFTCATE OF SERVICE 
J,.-
Thereby cerli ly Lhat on this 5= day of September, 2013, T ~erved a copy of the foregoing 
instrument on opposing counsel as in<licalcd below: 
Eric R. Cl ark 
Clark & Associates, ALtorncys 
P. 0. llox 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
and mailed a copy to the court reporter at: 
Penny Tardiff 
Ada County Tmnscripl Dept. 
Ada County Comthouse 
200 W. Front St., Room 4171 
Boise, TD 83702 
AMENDED NOTlCE OF AP.PEAL - 4 
Via Hand Ddivery 
C?via Facsimile - 939-7136 
Via U.S. Mail 
Daniel E. Williams 
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OCT 2 5 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By BRADLEY J. THIES 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDApreuTY 
MOSELL EQUITIES, an Idaho 
limited liability company 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC. 
an Idaho corporation, JOHN E. 
BERRYHILL III and AMY 
BERRYHILL, individually, and 
as husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Docket 
41338 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on October 24, 2013, 
I lodged a transcript 100 pages in length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
7 {.1~ 
(S~ure of Reporter) 
Penny L. Tardiff, CSR 
10/24/2013 
----------------- ------------------------
Hearing Date: Ju 1 y 11, 2013 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, Supreme Court Case No. 41338 
Plaintiff-Respondent, CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporaton, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III 
and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and 
as husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 25th day of October, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
000123
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCTOF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, Supreme Court Case No. 41338 
Plaintiff-Respondent, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporaton, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III 
and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and 
as husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: OCT 2 8 2013 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ERIC R. CLARK 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
EAGLE, IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MOSELL EQUITIES, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, Supreme Court Case No. 41338 
Plaintiff-Respondent, CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
vs. 
BERRYHILL & COMPANY, INC., an 
Idaho corporaton, JOHN E. BERRYHILL III 
and AMY BERRYHILL, individually, and 
as husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY. that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
22nd day of August, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
